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Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the
Mathematics of Clinical Violence
Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization
DOUGLAS MOSSMAN
That this Article on the mathematics of violence predictions and involun-
tary hospitalization decisions is being prepared for a symposium on "Domestic
Violence, Child Abuse, and the Law" requires that I begin by providing
readers with an explanation of the connection between what may initially
appear to be quite different subjects.
Scientific studies and evaluations of mental health professionals' predictions
of violence typically have focused on the incidence of violence,' the character-
istics of perpetrators,2 and the ability of clinicians to distinguish those persons
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Psychiatry and the Law in Orlando, Florida in October 1991; at the Department of
Psychiatry at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine in October 1991; and at the
Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association in Washington, D.C. in May
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Psychiatry, P.O. Box 927, Dayton, Ohio 45401-0927. Telephone: (513) 276-8325. Fax:
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1. See, for example, Thomas J. Craig, An Epidemiologic Study of Problems Associated
with Violence among Psychiatric Inpatients, 139 Am J Psychiatry 1262 (1982); Bruce G.
Link, Howard Andrews, and Francis T. Cullen, The Violent and Illegal Behavior of
Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 Am Soc Rev 275 (1992); Jeffrey W. Swanson, et al, Vio-
lence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic
Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp & Community Psychiatry 761 (1990). The last two
studies both conclude that persons with mental disorders have higher rates of violent and
illegal behavior than persons without such disorders.
2. See, for example, Kenneth Tardiff and Attia Sweillam, Assault, Suicide, and Mental
Illness, 37 Arch Gen Psychiatry 164 (1980); William B. Lawson, Jerome A. Yesavage, and
Paul D. Werner, Race, Violence, and Psychopathology, 45 J Clin Psychiatry 294 (1984);
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who will be violent from those who will not.3 In the vast majority of these re-
ports, the identity of the victims of violence is not mentioned. But the relative-
ly few studies that focus on the targets of psychiatric patients' assaults suggest
that family members are the most at risk.4 One study of three hundred
patients admitted to a short-term psychiatric ward found that forty-six (fifteen
percent) patients assaulted another person in the two weeks before admission,
that over half of these forty-six patients had assaulted family members, and
"that even after assaulting a family member, the majority of patients planned
to return to live with their families after discharge."' A recent review of
studies about clinical violence prediction found similar rates of recent violence
among newly admitted psychiatric patients.' Thus, decisions about admissions
to psychiatric hospitals frequently have important and immediate implications
for the bodily safety (as well as the feelings) of the family members with
whom patients live.7
Especially in publicly-funded psychiatric facilities, a large fraction of
patients are admitted involuntarily in accordance with state civil commitment
statutes,8 which anticipate that mental health professionals will make decisions
Kenneth Tardiff, Characteristics of Assaultive Patients in Private Hospitals, 141 Am J
Psychiatry 1232 (1984).
3. The mental health and criminological literature contains scores of publications
about this subject. I summarize the results of forty-four studies in Douglas Mossman,
Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate about Accuracy, 62 J Consulting & Clin
Psych 783 (1994).
4. See, for example, Tardiff, 141 Am J Psychiatry at 1232 (cited in note 2); Andrew
E. Skodol and Toksoz B. Karasu, Emergency Psychiatry and the Assaultive Patient, 135
Am J Psychiatry 202, 203 (1978); Renee L. Binder and Dale E. McNiel, Victims and
Families of Violent Psychiatric Patients, 14 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 131 (1986).
5. Binder and McNiel, 14 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L at 137 (cited in note 4).
Twenty-five patients had committed twenty-nine assaults toward family members: ten
assaults were toward a parent, seven toward a spouse, six toward a sibling, three toward
a child, and three toward a nephew or niece. Id at 133.
6. Randy K. Otto, Prediction of Dangerous Behavior: A Review and Analysis of "Sec-
ond-Generation" Research, 5 Forensic Rptr 103, 111 (1992).
7. A recent study suggests that family members may account for a large fraction of
the victims killed by seriously mentally ill persons. Family members were the victims of
fifty-four percent of those individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity in Connecticut
over the years 1985-92. By way of comparison, fourteen percent of all persons murdered
in the U.S. in 1990 were killed by family members. Carl Sherman, Half of "'Insane"'
Murderers Kill within the Family, 21 Clin Psychiatry News 2 (Dec 1993) (describing an
October 1993 presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law's Annual
Meeting by Deborah Scott and colleagues).
8. For example, in a study of 666 patients who presented themselves for care at a
large, urban psychiatric emergency service, forty-nine percent were hospitalized and sixty-
three percent of these admissions were involuntary. Sarah Rosenfield, Race Differences in
Involuntary Hospitalization: Psychiatric vs. Labeling Perspectives, 25 J Health & Soc Beh
14, 15-16 (1984). Although police involvement is a major factor in predicting whether a
petition for commitment will result in involuntary hospitalization, approximately seventy
percent of the persons who initiate commitments are family members. Ralph Sloveriko,
Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 28 Hosp & Community Psychiatry 317,
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about initiating involuntary psychiatric hospitalization based on judgments
about the imminent risk that their patients pose to others.9 The inadequacy of
clinical predictions of violence has been the subject of extensive literature'
that consistently criticizes psychiatrists' ability to gauge individuals' long-term
future dangerousness. 1 Evaluations of this criticism have noted that emergen-
cy commitment proceedings are not concerned with long-term dangerousness,
but with behavior that will occur over a relatively short time following the
prediction. 2 As part of the evolution of "a second generation of thought on
violence prediction," 13 recent studies report that involuntarily hospitalized
patients have a high degree of violence immediately before and after hospital-
ization" and that professional judgments about these patients' dangerousness
819 (1977).
9. State laws generally allow for the hospitalization of mentally ill persons under
court order provided that such persons meet the statutory definition of mental illness and,
because of that illness, represent a danger to themselves or others. Beginning with Lessard
v Schmidt, 413 F Supp 1318 (E D Wis 1976), courts across the United States struck
down then-existing state commitment statutes as being too broad or too vague. In
response, all states eventually passed commitment statutes that made dangerousness to self
or others (as opposed to simple need for treatment) a necessary condition for involuntary
psychiatric hospitalization. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil
and Criminal SS 2.06, 2.17-2.19 (Michie 1989 & Supp 1993); Edward Beis, State Invol-
untary Commitment Statutes, 7 Ment Disab L Rptr 358 (1983); Richard Lonsdorf, The
Involuntary Commitment of Adults: An Examination of Recent Legal Trends, 6 Psychiatric
Clin N Am 651 (1983); John Monahan and Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness and Commit-
ment of the Mentally Disordered in the United States, 15 Schizophrenia Bull 541 (1989).
These more restrictive statutes have been criticized (chiefly by clinicians and family mem-
bers) for not making possible the commitment of persons who desperately need treatment
but who are not imminently dangerous to themselves or others. See, for example, Com-
mittee on Government Policy, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Forced Into
Treatment: The Role of Coercion in Clinical Practice 31-43, 59-62 (1994). For a discus-
sion and summary of recent statutory changes, see Robert D. Miller, Need-for-Treatment
Criteria for Involuntary Civil Commitment: Impact in Practice, 149 Am J Psychiatry 1380
(1992). For a scathing criticism of professionals' typical approaches to making commitment
decisions, see Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U Miami L Rev 625, 644-52 (1993).
10. For a review, see Perlin, Mental Disability Law §§ 2.14-2.15 (cited in note 9).
11. Bruce J. Ennis and Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper-
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal L Rev 693 (1974); David Faust and Jay
Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 Sci 31 (1988).
12. John Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 56 (US Dept of Health
& Human Serv, 1981); Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 106 (cited in note 6).
13. The "second generation" of violence prediction studies derive their designation from
Monahan's call for and description of research that would overcome shortcomings
discussed in Monahan, Clinical Prediction (cited in note 12). See John Monahan, The
Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation of Theory and Policy, 141
Am J Psychiatry 10, 11 (1984). For a recent summary of "second generation" findings, see
Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 103 (cited in note 6).
14. Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 111 (cited in note 6); Dale E. McNiel and Renee L.
Binder, Violence, Civil Commitment, and Hospitalization, 174 J Nerv & Ment Disease 107
(1986); A. Michael Rossi, et al, Characteristics of Psychiatric Patients Who Engage in
19951
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have "a relatively high degree of short-term predictive validity."" s
The accuracy of violence prediction may be less important to practicing
clinicians than a closely related but distinct question: when should mental
health professionals predict violence? Two decades after the initial Tarasoff
decision, 6 psychotherapists in most jurisdictions 7 can anticipate being held
accountable for not having warned victims about, or taken measures to
prevent, the behavior of patients whose violence should have been anticipat-
ed.18 Even where their liability has been limited through legislative initiatives
that define adequate responses to potentially dangerous patients, 9 clinicians
still are expected to take action2" when the potential for violence, as indicated
by some combination of their patients' acts and thoughts, reaches a threshold
of "foreseeability." 2" As Dr. Paul Appelbaum has noted, decisions following
Assaultive or Other Fear-Inducing Behaviors, 174 J Nerv & Ment Disease 154, 157-59
(1986).
15. Dale E. McNiel and Renee L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of Danger-
ousness in Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 Am J Psychiatry 197, 197 (1987).
16. Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California, 13 Cal3d 177, 529 P2d 553
(1974) ("Tarasoff I"), reargued 17 Cal3d 425, 551 P2d 334 (1976) ("Tarasoff II").
Tarasoff I found that psychotherapists have a duty to warn potential victims of their
patients. Tarasoff I, 529 P2d at 553. The California Supreme Court subsequently took the
unusual step of rehearing the case and, in Tarasoff II, held that psychotherapists have a
duty to protect potential victims. Tarasoff 11, 551 P2d at 334.
17. In most states where cases concerning therapists' duty to warn or protect have
been heard, courts have found that therapists do have a duty to intervene in some fashion
prior to violent action by their patients. See Mark J. Mills, The So-Called Duty to Warn:
The Psycbotberapeutic Duty to Protect Third Parties from Patients' Violent Acts, 2 Beh
Sci & L 237, 242-43 (1984). But in some states, courts have considered the issue and
have ruled that therapists do not have a Tarasoff-like duty. See, for example, Hopewell
v Adibempe, No. GD78-28756 ([Pa] CP, Allegheny County, 1981); Shaw v Glickman. 45
Md App 718, 415 A2d 625 (1980).
18. "After a decade of litigation, the public policy, as it stands to date, dictates that
the psychotherapist is required to use reasonable care to protect a third party from a
potentially dangerous patient. The psychotherapist should use reasonable care in assessing
the patient's potential for violence, identifying and notifying the possible victim or victims,
and informing a law enforcement agency, sometimes even when no specific victim can be
identified." Mark J. Mills, Greer Sullivan, and Spencer Eth, Protecting Third Parties: A
Decade After Tarasoff, 144 Am J Psychiatry 68, 71 (1987).
19. By 1989, twelve states had legislative definitions of the duty (with Ohio law
precluding liability). Paul S. Appelbaum, et al, Statutory Approaches to Limiting
Psychiatrists' Liability for Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 Am J Psychiatry 821, 823
(1989).
20. Such actions may take various forms, including warning the potential victim(s),
informing police, attempting to commit the patient, voluntarily hospitalizing the patient, or
taking other reasonable measures (e.g., providing medication). In those states where liability
has been statutorily defined, laws often specify what interventions will discharge the duty.
See Appelbaum, et al, 146 Am J Psychiatry at 824-28 (cited in note 19).
21. For example, in Tarasoff II, 551 P2d at 345, the threshold for taking action to
protect a third party who is a foreseeable victim of the dangerous patient is reached "once
a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably
should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of
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Tarasoff have emphasized that a duty to protect arises "only when a threshold
of probability is crossed, . . . [but] the terms used to define that threshold
have varied, and never has it been specified with any precision."'
Although professional standards, and not prediction accuracy, provide the
criteria by which Tarasoff liability is often judged,' these standards ideally
should reflect actual features of professionals' predictions. If clinicians are to
be faulted for the violent acts of their patients, then evaluations of their
prediction-based decisions should reflect our knowledge about the intrinsic
characteristics and accuracy of those predictions coupled with our judgments
about the moral and societal interests affected by those decisions.
This Article has two major purposes. First, it provides a mathematical
description of an ideal procedure for making clinical decisions about patients'
future violence, a description that provides a context for evaluating clinicians'
"dangerousness decisions." For purposes of illustration, the Article uses a spe-
cific clinical situation-deciding whether to hospitaize involuntarily a patient
based on his risk of harming another. The Article argues that the decision
involves balancing potential risks to third parties (often the patient's family
members24) with the "massive deprivation of liberty"25 and other potential
harms26 to the patient that could result from confinement. The mathematical
description of the decision procedure consists of a comprehensive method for
describing the accuracy of predictions or prediction instruments,27 a method
for assigning values to correct and incorrect predictions," a method for
adjusting predictions based on those values,29 and-most importantly-an ex-
violence to others." I know of no psychiatric professional standard that tells clinicians how
great a danger must be in order for it to be deemed "serious." For a discussion of the
difficulty in specifying a useful statutory definition of foreseeability, see Appelbaum, et al,
146 Am J Psychiatry at 822-24 (cited in note 19).
22. Paul S. Appelbaum, Ask the Experts, 17 Am Acad Psychiatry L Newsl 19 (1992).
23. In a recent article informing clinicians about violence risk assessment, Dr. Tardiff
notes,
Whether psychiatrists can predict violence by patients is a controversial topic ...
[I]t has been my experience and that of my colleagues who serve as expert witness-
es in lawsuits that evidence in a patient's record reflecting consideration of violence
is more important than the accuracy of the prediction. That the psychiatrist gathered
relevant data, made a decision about the potential for violence and recorded that
decision assures the law that there was serious consideration of violence. The law
does not expect psychiatrists to be accurate all the time, but it does expect us to
try.
Kenneth Tardiff, How to Recognize a Potentially Violent Patient, Psychiatric Times 13
(Mar 1993).
24. See notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
25. Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 (1979) (citations omitted) (holding that
"clear and convincing" evidence of mental illness is needed to meet federal constitutional
due process guarantees in involuntary commitment proceedings).
26. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
27. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
28. See notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
29. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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plicit means for expressing uncertainty in those values."0
Second, the Article evaluates the actual impact of uncertainty on an ideal
decision procedure. When we combine our uncertainty about moral valuations
of right and wrong decisions, our uncertainty about base rates, and our
uncertainty about the relevant time periods over which predictions should
apply, what results is an uncertainty about the correctness of prediction-based
decisions that makes most criticism of those decisions untenable.3 'This
Article shows that our uncertainty about the factors intrinsic to a hypothetical,
best-case prediction procedure usually would preclude valid post hoc criticism
of wrong decisions about dangerousness; a fortiori, most real-life prediction
errors also should be beyond criticism.
Demonstrating these points will require me to make explicit and (I hope)
non-controversial assumptions about a clinical decision process that is often
governed by implicit assumptions or unconscious heuristics. 2 This Article's as-
30. See notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
31. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
32. "Research has been done on issues such as interclinician agreement, but little on
which criteria they actually use in forming their opinions." Vernon L. Quinsey and Anne
Maguire, Maximum Security Psychiatric Patients: Actuarial and Clinical Prediction of
Dangerousness, 1 J Interpersonal Violence 143, 148 (1986). No systematic studies of how
clinicians make violence predictions have been published. Thomas R. Litwack, Stuart M.
Kirschner, and Renate C. Wack, The Assessment of Dangerousness and Predictions of
Violence: Recent Research and Future Prospects, 64 Psychiatric Q 245, 266 (1993).
However, several authors have reported their observations concerning clinicians' use of
faulty decision-making procedures and stereotypes. See, for example, Virginia A. Hiday and
Lynn N. Smith, Effects of the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment, 15 J Psychi-
atry & L 433, 449 (1987) (finding that aberrant behavior by a few patients distorted
perceptions of outcome, that mental health professionals overstate percentage of commit-
ments that begin as police referrals or that jeopardize staff safety, and that the "drama of
a few cases caused their retelling while the mundane cases faded from memory"); see also
George E. Dix, Determining the Continued Dangerousness of Psychologically Abnormal Sex
Offenders, 3 J Psychiatry & L 327 (1975); Stephen J. Pfohl, Predicting Dangerousness:
The Social Construction of Psychiatric Reality (Lexington, 1978); Christopher D. Webster
and Robert J. Menzies, The Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, in David N. Weisstub,
3 Law and Mental Health: International Perspectives (Pergamon, 1987).
"'Heuristics' is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to implicit thinking
devices that individuals use to oversimplify complex, information-processing tasks. The use
of these heuristic devices often leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions,
and causes decision-makers to 'ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information."'
Perlin, 47 U Miami L Rev at 660 (cited in note 9) (quoting Michael L. Perlin, Psychody-
namics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69
Neb L Rev 3, 14-15 (1990)). Examples of such cognitive devices are "vividness" d.e.,
memory of a single, highly memorable event outweighs voluminous but bland data),
"availability" (i.e., probability of an event is judged based on ease with which we can
recall a similar event), and "hindsight bias" (i.e., exaggerating in retrospect the ease with
which an event could or should have been predicted). Perlin, 69 Neb L Rev at 15-17
(cited in this note); David B. Wexler and Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct
for Juror Hindsight Bias, 7 Beh Sci & L 485, 487-89 (1989). The major scholarly work
on the subject is Daniel Kahneman, et al, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
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sumptions include an open recognition that prediction mistakes are inevita-
ble.3" In describing a mechanism for equitably balancing the negative conse-
quences of prediction errors, this Article takes the viewpoint that such balanc-
ing should reflect a decision-making strategy governed by public attitudes
about suffering violence and suffering involuntary hospitalization.34 Because
they are explicit, this Article's assumptions can be evaluated for their norma-
tive value or their agreement with empirical findings.
I. Dangerousness Decisions: A Mathematical Description
A. DEFINITIONS
This Section describes the implementation and the mathematical properties
of prediction methods that might be used to make decisions about future
dangerousness.35 In the following discussion, the term dangerousness decision
refers to a decision to initiate a certain clinical action-for example, the involun-
tary hospitalization of a patient-based on an estimate of the likelihood of
violence during some future time period. Dangerousness refers to the likelihood
or probability that someone will act violently. Thus someone can be described as
having a "low level" or a "high level" of dangerousness, implying, respectively,
a low or a high chance of acting violently. Violence detection instrument refers
to what might be regarded as a "diagnostic test" of future violence; that is, a
method or technique used to sort those persons who will commit acts of violence
toward others over some future time period from those who will not. A predic-
tion of violence is a judgment that someone's dangerousness is high enough that
he should be treated as though he will act violently. A dangerous person is one
whose dangerousness is high enough to warrant a prediction of violence.
Biases (Cambridge, 1982).
33. In clinical practice, one generally does not receive unbiased feedback about one's
judgments and this may explain why clinicians consistently overestimate the accuracy of
their diagnoses and predictions and systematically ignore information that would improve
accuracy. David Faust, Data Integration in Legal Evaluations: Can Clinicians Deliver on
Their Premises?, 7 Beh Sci & L 469, 480 (1989).
34. This decision-making strategy and its empirical investigation are discussed in detail
in Douglas Mossman and Kathleen J. Hart, How Bad Is Civil Commitment? A Study of
Attitudes toward Violence and Involuntary Hospitalization, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry
& L 181, 182 (1993) and explained briefly in notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
35. Several writers have lamented the ambiguity and multiple meanings of the term
"dangerousness" and have offered clarifying statements similar to those in this paragraph.
For an oft-cited example, see Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 Am Psych 224, 224-25 (1978).
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B. DEVELOPING A VIOLENCE DETECTION INSTRUMENT36
We can understand the theory behind mathematical descriptions of violence
detection methods by considering the process of calibrating an airport metal
detector. The purpose of the detector is to render a "diagnosis" about passengers
who walk through; the condition to be "diagnosed" is whether a passenger is
carrying a weapon. Suppose that the sensitivity of the detector is not fixed, that
its alarm is controlled by a dial marked from 0 to 100, and that the lower the
dial setting, the smaller the amount of metal that will trigger the alarm. If the
dial is set very low, the detector will be so sensitive that dental fillings will
trigger the alarm; if the dial is set too high, annoying false alarms (for pocket
change and belt buckles) will be uncommon, but some small guns and knives
might evade detection. Given that false alarms are a small annoyance compared
to the problems caused by letting an armed passenger board, airport security
personnel will probably set the dial so that false alarms are at the minimum level
that still detects just about all weapons.
Mental health professionals do not have "violence detectors" through which
their patients walk, but their task in evaluating patients for involuntary hospital-
ization based on possible future violence poses the same problems faced by
airport personnel. We can think of clinicians as having their patients "pass
through" an evaluation process that (among other things) attempts to sort those
who will be violent from those who will not, and we can imagine that clinicians
try to adjust their threshold for admission to effect the best balance between
unnecessary hospitalizations (i.e., hospitalizations of persons who would not be
violent if released) and letting violent persons go. An adjustable decision thresh-
old is a general feature of violence detection methods, and this means that we
can describe many different kinds of violence prediction instruments-whether
they be rating scales,37 "actuarial" assessments,38 blood tests," or even situa-
36. This Section summarizes several more extensive expositions, which for readers'
sakes I shall not cite repeatedly. For more detailed discussions and explanations, see
Eugene Somoza, Louis Soutullo-Esperon, and Douglas Mossman, Evaluation and
Optimization of Diagnostic Tests Using Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis and
Information Theory, 24 Intl J Biomed Computing 153 (1989); Mossman, 62 J Consulting
& Clin Psych at 783 (cited in note 3); Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry
& L at 183-85 (cited in note 34).
37. A rating scale might rank subjects according to their likelihood of future violence.
For an example, see Monahan, Clinical Prediction at 68-71 (cited in note 12) (discussing
the Michigan Department of Corrections' "Assaultive Risk Screening Sheet").
38. By "actuarial" assessments, I mean those methods that utilize combinations of ex-
plicit facts about an individual to estimate his risk of acting violently. A typical example
would involve entering demographic facts (i.e., age, sex, or socio-economic status), personal
history (i.e., previous arrests or age of first contact with criminal justice system), and psy-
chological factors (i.e., drug abuse, psychosis, or character pathology) in an equation that
models probability of acting violently during some future period of time. See, for example,
Deidre Klassen and William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence
in Adult Male Mental Healths Admissions, 12 L & Human Beh 143 (1988); Deidre
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tions where the "instrument" of prediction is a mental health professional who
uses "clinical judgment" (an "educated guess") about a patient's future behav-
ior4 --using a single mathematical framework that captures this adjustability.
The framework I shall describe is suitable for use with any definition of violent
act, in any population, so long as methodological and statistical rigor are main-
tained.4
For clarity of presentation, I shall refer to a hypothetical future violence test
(FVT), which ranks patients' short-term dangerousness from 0 (lowest) to 100
(highest). To simplify our discussion, let us assume that the methodological
problems that usually plague investigators" can be solved. We assume, for
Klassen and William A. O'Connor, Assessing the Risk of Violence in Released Adult Men-
tal Patients: A Cross-Validation Study, 1 J Consulting & Clinical Psych 75 (1989). For
additional discussion, see Robyn M. Dawes, et al, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243
Sci 1668 (1989). I review the accuracy of several such assessment methods (and challenge
the perceived view that they are more accurate than clinical judgments) in Mossman, 62
J Consulting & Clinical Psych at 783 (cited in note 3).
39. See, for example, Matti Virkkunen, et al, Relationship of Psychobiological Variables
to Recidivism in Violent Offenders and Impulsive Fire Setters, 46 Arch Gen Psychiatry
600, 602 (1989) (employing discriminant function to predict dangerousness that incorpo-
rates measurements of blood glucose and cerebrospinal fluid levels of serotonin metabo-
lites). The relationship between serotonin and impulsive or violent behavior is reviewed in
Gerald L. Brown and Markku I. Linnoila, CSF Serotonin Metabolite (S-HIAA) Studies in
Depression, Impulsivity, and Violence, 51 J Clin Psychiatry 31, 31-41 (Apr 1990 Supp).
For another example of using physical factors to predict violence, see E. Kandel, et al,
Minor Physical Anomalies and Recidivistic Adult Violent Criminal Behavior, 79 Acta
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 103 (1989) (finding that external signs of defects in fetal central
nervous system development are correlated with violent offenses).
40. Because the dangerousness assessments made by most clinicians do not use any
formal tools for measuring likelihood of violence, "clinical judgment" is the most
commonly used method for gauging dangerousness in everyday practice. For criticisms of
this approach, see Dawes, et al, 243 Sci at 1668 (cited in note 38) (suggesting that
actuarial judgments are more accurate than clinical judgments); Thomas Grisso and Paul
S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 L & Human
Beh 621, 623-28 (1992) (suggesting that clinicians should avoid yes-no dangerousness
predictions and should attempt to make actuarially-based risk assessments). But see
Litwack, Kirschner, and Wack, 64 Psychiatric Q at 267-68 (cited in note 32) (qualifying
position of Grisso and Appelbaum); Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 783
(cited in note 3) (showing that properly-evaluated actuarial methods are no more accurate
than clinical judgment).
41. 1 describe a methodologically-perfect imaginary "study" of the accuracy of violence
predictions in Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clinical Psych at 783 (cited in note 3).
Among the study's investigators are omniscient observers who are able to determine with
certainty which patients act violently after a clinical assessment. Real-life studies are
plagued by a host of problems, such as defining what "counts" as violence (verbal threats?
drunk driving? hostile gestures?) and determining who actually acted violently, as well as
ethical and legal restrictions that make ideal studies of violence prediction impossible. For
additional discussion of these methodological issues, see Monahan, Clinical Prediction at
50-56 (cited in note 12); Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 107-08 (cited in note 6); Litwack,
Kirschner, and Wack, 64 Psychiatric Q at 262-66 (cited in note 32).
42. That is, those problems discussed in note 41.
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example, that what constitutes a "dangerous act" is crisply defined and that
individuals' behavior can be ascertained reliably, so that our knowledge of the
"truth" about subjects-i.e., whether they acted violently during the time
period-is beyond reasonable doubt.
The first step in evaluating the FVT would involve applying the test to an
appropriate group of individuals, who would be monitored over a period of time
thereafter. An "appropriate group" would be one comparable to those persons
to whom the test ultimately would be applied. For example, if clinicians planned
to use the FVT to make hospitalization decisions, they would evaluate its
performance on individuals subject to involuntary hospitalization, who could be
observed reliably for a period of several days.43
Second, the results of the test would be evaluated. The scores of the non-
violent subjects would be compared with those who acted violently. Assuming
that the FVT had some predictive value, we would expect the non-violent
subjects' scores to be lower than those of the violent subjects'. We would also
expect that the FVT would not be a perfect predictor of future dangerousness, so
that the groups' scores would form overlapping distributions.
For the sake of exposition, let us imagine that the FVT was applied to 2,200
persons of whom 200 acted violently during their observation periods. The
distributions of their FVT scores are shown in Figure 1. In looking at Figure 1,
one sees that the violent patients, whose distribution peaks at 60, generally
scored higher than the non-violent patients, whose distribution peaks at 40.
These results suggest that the FVT provides information that is helpful in
distinguishing violent from non-violent patients. However, the scores of the
violent and non-violent patients overlap, implying that the FVT does not sort the
two groups perfectly. The likelihood that a patient will act violently given a
certain FVT score is represented by the dashed line in Figure 1. Notice that
between 40 and 65-the portion of the scale where many of the violent patients'
scores lie-clinicians using the FVT would obtain estimates of dangerousness that
were far from certainty.
This imperfection leads us to the third part of the FVT's development, which
requires choosing some value along the scale on which to base decisions about
its future use, some threshold beyond which persons with higher scores might be
committed involuntarily. I shall refer to this third step--choosing a decision
threshold or operating point-as operationalizing the test.
Consider three possible cut-offs--40, 50, and 60-for the rating scale. In
each case, persons with scores falling above the threshold are test-positive, and
those falling below, test-negative. As one moves the threshold higher (from 40 to
50 to 60) the kinds of correct identifications change: the fraction of actually
violent persons correctly identified by the scale (the scale's sensitivity or true
positive rate (TPR)) decreases, but the probability of correctly identifying a non-
violent person (the scale's specificity or true negative rate (TNR)) increases.
43. For an example of one such study, see McNiel and Binder, 144 Am J Psychiatry
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Fig. 1. A hypothetical "Future Violence Test" for predicting violence.
The left-most distribution (mean ± s.d. = 40 ± 10) represents test results
of individuals who actually are non-violent; the right-most distribution
(mean = 60, s.d. = 10), actually violent persons. The S-shaped curve
shows the likelihood of violence associated with each FVT score, assum-
ing that the base rate is 0.10.
Similarly, the kinds of misidentifications change: as the threshold is moved high-
er, fewer patients are wrongly deemed violent (false positives), but more actually
violent patients are deemed non-violent (false negatives).
The types of errors and the error rates at three different thresholds are
shown in Table 1. Table 1 provides a good summary of diagnostic performance
at these thresholds but does not tell us which, if any, of these thresholds is the
best one to choose.
C. OPERATIONALIZING A PREDICTION METHOD44
The task of operationalizing a test requires that one effect a balance between
sensitivity and specificity by choosing a threshold that reflects the risks and
benefits of test outcomes. To put this another way: given that diagnostic
44. This section is adapted from a discussion in Eugene Somoza and Douglas
Mossman, "Biological Markers" and Psychiatric Diagnosis: Risk-Benefit Balancing Using




Performance of the "Future Violent Test" at Three Decision Thresholds
(Assuming Base Rate of Violence = Pr = 0.10)
Decision Threshold 40 50 60
Number of True Positives' 195 168 100
Number of True Negatives2  1,000 1,683 1,954
Number of False Positives3  1,000 317 46
Number of False Negatives 4  5 32 100
False Positive Rate (FPR)s  0.500 0.159 0.023
True Positive Rate (TPR)6  0.975 0.841 0.500
FP:TP Ratio 7  5.1 1.9 0.46
Marginal Tradeoff8  74 10 0.74
1. "True Positives": violent patients who are correctly identified.
2. "True Negatives": non-violent patients who are correctly identified.
3. "False Positives": non-violent patients who are misidentified as violent.
4. "False Negatives": violent patients who are misidentified as non-violent.
5. FPR = fraction of non-violent patients wrongly predicted to be violent.
6. TPR = fraction of violent patients correctly predicted to be violent.
7. FP:TP Ratio = number of false positives divided by number of true positives.
8. Marginal Tradeoff = number (at this threshold) of addtional false positives needed to
correctly identify one additional violent patient. See note 55.
tests-even very accurate ones-are imperfect, diagnostic errors are inevitable.
Actual use of tests therefore requires the adoption of a strategy for balancing the
consequences of erroneous judgments and the benefits of correct decisions. In the
case at hand, this involves balancing the costs of a false-positive prediction
(committing a non-violent person) and the costs of a false-negative prediction
(not committing a violent person) with the benefits yielded by correct (true-
positive and true-negative) predictions.
There is, in theory, a rational way of finding the optimal operating point
(OOP), the point on the decision scale that optimally balances the likelihoods
and the values of test outcomes.4" One would like to find the point along the
45. Actually, there are two rational approaches to finding the OOP. If one prefers all
outcomes equally, or if one has no way to assign values and costs to the various
outcomes, one might choose a decision threshold that maximizes information obtained
from the detection instrument. See Douglas Mossman and Eugene Somoza, Maximizing
Diagnostic Information from the Dexamethasone Suppression Test: An Approach to Cri-
terion Selection Using Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis, 46 Arch Gen Psychiatry
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scale where the expected net gain from the test is a maximum, which obviously
would be the OOP for the scale. Once this point is known, a "correct" danger-
ousness decision would be one that maximized the FVT's net gain. This would
be accomplished if persons with scores above the OOP were deemed dangerous
(and subject to involuntary hospitalization), and those with scores below, not
dangerous. Not all of these judgments would be correct, but they would repre--
sent the best balance of errors and correct judgments.
To suggest that a decision should be made so as to maximize net expected
gain is to recommend, in a formal way, the use of decision procedure in which
all practicing physicians informally engage." In deciding on treatments for
almost any ailment, physicians frequently weigh the risks and benefits that will
accrue to their patients, taking-into consideration the possibility that their
diagnoses or decisions may be wrong. Physicians often make an explicit or im-
plicit judgment about the likelihood and seriousness of toxic side effects, the
potential costs of leaving a disorder untreated, and the consequences of mistreat-
ing due to diagnostic error.47
To approach the problem of operationalization more formally, we can
examine the following equation:
653 (1989); Eugene Somoza and Douglas Mossman, Comparing and Optimizing Diagnostic
Tests: An Information-Theoretical Approach, 12 Med Dec Making 179 (1992). As I
explain in notes 53-59 and the accompanying text, the outcomes of an involuntary
hospitalization decision are probably not equal in desirability: most of us would regard the
failure to detect a violent person as a worse error than deeming a non-violent person
violent. For this reason, cost-benefit balancing is clearly the best conceptual approach to
optimizing diagnostic performance.
46. This is not to suggest that physicians always act so as to maximize net expected
gain. In some situations, for example, they seem to prefer employing a strategy that mini-
mizes the possible losses or costs. For example, physicians commonly treat viral pharyngitis
(i.e., a sore throat) with antibiotics despite diagnostic information that it is not due to a
streptococcal infection (i.e., is not "strep throat" and that no benefit will accrue from
antibiotic therapy); doctors seem to prefer to adopt a treatment policy that always mini-
mizes the chance that a patient will suffer rheumatic fever, an uncommon sequela of
untreated streptococcal pharyngitis. See Scott D. Holmberg and Gerald A. Faich, Strepto-
coccal Pharyngitis and Acute Rheumatic Fever in Rhode Island, 250 JAMA 2307 (1983);
Jerris R. Hedges, Benita M. Singal, and Jennifer L. Estep, The Impact of a Rapid Screen
for Streptococcal Pharyngitis on Clinical Decision Making in the Emergency Department,
11 Med Dec Making 119 (1991). This general strategy is termed the "minimax regret,"
because the decision-maker chooses the option that minimizes the maximum regret
associated with all the outcomes. For a discussion of this and other decision strategies, see
Simon French, Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of Rationality 16-17,
36-39 (Ellis Horwood Ltd, 1988); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey 278-86 (John Wiley & Sons, 1967). The
minimax regret strategy is not a viable option for making involuntary admission decisions,
since it would dictate admitting everyone to avoid the risk of a released person acting
violently.
47. This is paradigmatically the case in the treatment of cancer, where both the disease
and its therapy can be fatal. For an example and discussion, see J. Robert Andrews,
Benefit, Risk, and Optimization by ROC Analysis in Cancer Radiotherapy, 11 Intl J
Radiation Oncology Biol Physics 1557 (1985).
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[1] Net Expected Gain = (Pr)(TPR)(GP) + (Pr)(1-TPR)(Cm)
+ (1-Pr)(FPR)(CFP) + (1-Pr)(1-FPR)(GT).
The net expected gain from a decision is the sum of four terms, which are
themselves the products of the benefits or costs associated with test outcomes
(GTP = gain from a true positive, CF = cost of a false negative, etc.) and the
probability of those outcomes. The probability of a true positive test (in this
case, a correct prediction of violence) equals the base rate, or prior probability
(Pr) of violence in the population, multiplied by the TPR, the sensitivity of the
test; probabilities for other test outcomes can be calculated similarly. If we can
quantify gains and costs, specify the rate of violence, and determine the true and
false positive rates associated with each value of the FVT, we can find the
threshold that maximizes net expected gain.
D. ASSIGNING VALUES TO OUTCOMES
The values associated with decision outcomes might be estimated in several
ways. In theory, one might calculate the average dollar costs and benefits
associated with the outcomes, and use these values in the equation. For example,
the cost of a false negative (incorrectly predicting non-violence) would include
estimates of medical costs associated with the death or injury of victims, costs to
society (e.g., court costs and the cost of incarcerating the perpetrator), the cost
of pain and suffering, losses from missing work, malpractice liability, and so on.
The problem with this approach should already be obvious: even if we could
enumerate all the outcomes associated with a false positive and could determine
how likely each one of these outcomes would be given a false positive decision,
and even if it were appropriate to rate these outcomes using monetary values, it
still would be extremely difficult to agree on what monetary values should be
assigned.48 The practical and conceptual difficulties with this approach49 have
led decision theorists to advocate use of a different quantitative method that
rates outcomes according to their relative utility."0 Accordingly, we can rewrite
Equation 1 as follows:
[1'] Expected Utility = EU = (Pr)(TPR)(UP) + (Pr)(1-TPR)(UFN)
+ (1-Pr)(FPR)(Up) + (1-Pr)(1-FPR)(UT,),
48. For these reasons, most medical decision theorists find it more meaningful or sen-
sible to use utility theory-discussed further in notes 50-61 and the accompanying text-to
rank the relative value of outcomes. Dennis D. Patton and James M. Woolfenden, A
Utility-Based Model for Comparing the Cost-Effectiveness of Diagnostic Studies, 24 Investi-
gative Radiol 263, 265 (1989).
49. Indeed, for most clinical decisions, systematic consideration of all the separate
possible outcomes seems unfathomable. Somoza and Mossman, 12 Med Dec Making at
185 (cited in note 45).
50. At this point in the exposition, I rely on readers' intuitive understanding of the
term "utility." In decision analysis, the term has a formal definition, which I explain in
note 60 and the accompanying text.
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where Up is the utility associated with a true positive, UF is the utility associat-
ed with a false negative, etc. Customarily, the outcome-associated utilities are
rated on a scale, which is set so that 0 represents the worst possible outcome and
1 represents the best possible outcome."1 Subjective though this method may be,
it forces us to assign relative values to the available options and to rank those
options in accordance with our fears, hopes, and moral preferences. Pegging the
best and worst outcomes at 1 and 0 normalizes the scale and permits relative
valuations of intermediate outcomes. Assigning values to outcomes also permits
comparison of two or more prediction methods. 2
If we assume that not detecting an individual who goes on to commit an act
of violence (a false negative judgment) is the worst outcome, then UN is assigned
a utility value of 0. Correctly detecting a person who would otherwise commit
an act of serious violence (a "true positive") and correctly detecting a non-violent
person (a "true negative") both allow for the preservation of public safety
without needless infringements on individual liberty. I shall assume in this
discussion that both correct outcomes can be assigned a utility value of 1, im-
plying that they are equally desirable. A "false positive" judgment that involun-
tarily hospitalizes a person who would not have been violent needlessly deprives
an individual of his liberty. I shall assume that this outcome is neither as desir-
able as a correct judgment nor as undesirable as a false negative; therefore, U,
would be assigned a utility value intermediate between 0 and 1." The uncer-
tainties (inter- or intra-personal) in utility estimates can be expressed explicitly by
assigning utilities a range, i.e., a value ± error. This allows us to give a mathe-
matical characterization-albeit a rough one-to the impact of uncertainty on
the operationalizing of a violence prediction tool. 4
51. Methods for assigning utilities along such a scale have been discussed extensively
in the decision analysis literature. See, for example, Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions
at 12-38 (cited in note 46); French, Decision Theory at 16-17, 36-39 (cited in note 46);
Robert D. Behn and James W. Vaupel, Quick Analysis for Busy Decision Makers (Basic,
1982); Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Choice: The Psychology of Decision (John Wiley
& Sons, 1980); Barbara J. McNeil and S. J. Adelstein, Determining the Value of Diag-
nostic and Screening Tests, 17 J Nucl Med 439 (1976).
52. Patton and Woolfenden, 24 Investigative Radiol at 265 (cited in note 48).
53. Readers may differ on this point. One alternative procedure for assigning utilities
might look strictly at the outcomes, which are release of a non-violent person (TN), re-
lease of a violent person (FN), and involuntary hospitalization (TP, FP). Because they have
been hospitalized, the false positives (who would not have been violent had they been
released) are indistinguishable from the true positives (those who would have been violent);
both groups suffer confinement against their will, which is not as desirable as releasing
someone who is non-violent (UTN = 1) or as undesirable as releasing a violent person (UIN
= 0). Another alternative procedure might assign the highest utility to TP judgments
because they both protect the public and provide hospitalization for a person who needs
it but will not voluntarily accept it. Fortunately, the main point of this paper is not
affected by these different approaches so long as UT, UFp, and UTN all have values close
to 1, that is, so long as false negatives are seen as much less desirable than the other
outcomes. Interested readers may rework my calculations to demonstrate this to themselves.
54. As we shall see at notes 85-86 and the accompanying text, even a rough char-
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Monahan has suggested that "it may be possible ethically to justify short-
term commitment even if the predictions of imminent violence on which it is
based are less accurate than the long-term research indicates. Paraphrasing
Blackstone, it may be better that ten 'false positives' suffer commitment for three
days than that one 'false negative' go free to kill someone during that period.""
I suspect most readers would believe it reasonable to commit more than ten non-
violent patients to prevent one patient from murdering someone. Not all acts of
violence, however, are murders. 6 Some assaults frighten victims but cause little
acterization of this uncertainty is sufficient for describing crucial difficulties in actually
putting a prediction tool into use.
55. John Monahan, Strategies for an Empirical Analysis of the Prediction of Violence
in Emergency Civil Commitment, 1 L & Human Beh 363, 370 (1977) (emphasis in
original). Other historical authorities have suggested other ratios for wrongful acquittals
and convictions. See, for example, Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown: A Methodical
Summary (reprint of 1678 ed, Professional Books, 1972) (suggesting 5:1 ratio); John
Fortescue, A Learned Commendation of the Laws of England (reprint of 1567 ed, W. J.
Johnson, 1969) (suggesting 20:1 ratio). In establishing the appropriate burden of proof in
civil commitment hearings, Chief Justice Warren Burger used reasoning very similar to
Monahan: "One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of
treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It cannot be said, therefore, that
it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person
to be committed." Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 429 (1979) (citations omitted). For
a discussion of the legal literature's treatment of the "balancing" of wrongful commitments
and wrongful releases of mentally ill persons, see Perlin, Mental Disability Law at S 3.38
(cited in note 9).
Monahan's analytical approach has been applied to other kinds of decisions and is
termed the "preferred marginal tradeoff." In the medical context, "[tihis metric is the
number of treatment errors [i.e., treatments of persons without disease] that are acceptable
in order to treat correctly one additional person with the disease. In the framework of
utility theory, the preferred marginal tradeoff is equivalent to the ratio of the net benefit
of treating a diseased person to the net harm of treating a well person, so it is indepen-
dent of disease prevalence." Peter DeNeef and Daniel L. Kent, Using Treatment-Tradeoff
Preferences to Select Diagnostic Strategies: Linking the ROC Curve to Threshold Analysis,
13 Med Dec Making 126, 126 (1993) (emphasis in original).
56. A moment's thought reveals that the outcome of a violent act is necessarily
ambiguous, and this ambiguity is one of "the conditions under which clinicians must make
dangerousness decisions. When evaluating a potentially dangerous patient, clinicians typi-
cally are not sure whether, how, or when the patient might engage in violence. And even
if a clinician did know, for example, that a patient would use a knife in an effort to
harm someone, the clinician could only guess whether the victim would escape harm,
receive minor wounds, be severely injured, or be killed." Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am
Acad Psychiatry & L at 191-92 (cited in note 34).
In their nineteen-month follow-up of 1,938 former psychiatric patients, Cocozza and
colleagues found that 183 patients were arrested a total of 230 times. Joseph J. Cocozza,
Mary Evans Melick, and Henry J. Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime among Ex-mental
Patients, 16 Criminol 317, 322 (1978). Thirty-three patients were arrested for violent
crimes (i.e., murder, manslaughter, or assault) and seven were arrested for sex crimes. Id.
The remaining arrests were for robbery, burglary, property crimes, drug crimes, and
"minor crimes." Id. The felony arrest rate per thousand patients for this cohort was
98.50; the arrest rates for violent crimes, potentially violent crimes, and sex crimes were
12.03, 6.18, and 2.60, respectively. Id at 323.
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physical harm, and their evil approximates the evil of needless hospitalizations
more closely than does an act of murder. Moreover, involuntary hospitalization
of persons who, if left alone, would have been harmless is more than a mere
annoyanceS7 It can be stigmatizing s8 and damaging to an individual's career,
marriage, and nervous system.s9 These considerations suggest that assigning a
numerical value to U is an inherently imprecise task.
Let us now give this imprecision a mathematical characterization. To do this,
we must first define utility more formally.6" We can state that an individual
associates the utility Um with a state of affairs M when we know that he is
indifferent between two alternatives: (1) having that state of affairs M occur or
(2) engaging in a lottery in which state of affairs L with known utility UL has
chance y of occurring, and state of affairs N with known utility UN has chance
(1-y) of occurring. In the mathematical terms of formal decision theory, UM =
YUL + (1-Y)UN.
A study of 867 patients admitted to Bellevue Hospital from July 1969 through June
1971 found that 202 were arrested during the two years before and two years after
admission: thirty were arrested for violent crimes and fifty-five were arrested for potentially
violent crimes. Arthur Zitrin, et al, Crime and Violence among Mental Patients, 133 Am
J Psychiatry 142, 144 (1976). Arrest rates in this sample were slightly higher than those
for the general population in the Bellevue catchment area. Id at 147 tbl 6.
57. One way to quantify antipathy toward civil commitment would be to ask persons
whether they would prefer to be involuntarily hospitalized or subjected to an act of
violence. Mossman and Hart did just this and found (to their surprise) that twenty-eight
percent of a group of college undergraduates preferred being attacked by a man wielding
a knife to being hospitalized involuntarily for three days. Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am
Acad Psychiatry & L at 188 (cited in note 34).
58. The Supreme Court notes that civil commitment "can engender adverse social
consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomenon 'stigma' or choose to
call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and that
it can have a very significant impact on the individual." Addington, 441 US at 426. In
requiring a series of procedural safeguards in the transfer of convicted felons to mental
hospitals, the Court emphasized that "the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a
mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the
prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute
the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protection." Vitek v Jones, 445
US 480, 494 (1980).
59. Central nervous system damage may result from administration of antipsychotic
medications or "neuroleptics." Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is an extremely serious id-
iosyncratic reaction to these medications that can be associated with seizures, coma, and
death. Tardive dyskinesia is a usually-mild disorder that frequently results from lengthy
exposure to neuroleptic medications; it is characterized by permanent or long-standing
abnormal involuntary movements. George W. Arana and Steven E. Hyman, Handbook of
Psychiatric Drug Therapy 29 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1991). The chief use of neuroleptics
is the treatment of psychoses, id at 13-19, but they are also employed in a variety of
emergencies including those where patients are violent or assaultive. Harold I. Kaplan and
Benjamin J. Sadock, Synopsis of Psychiatry 560 (Williams & Wilkins, 6th ed 1991).
60. This paragraph presents an abbreviated discussion of formal utility theory. For
more extensive introductions, see Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions at 12-38 (cited
in note 46); French, Decision Theory at 149-209 (cited in note 46).
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From the standpoint of the public at large, a clinician's predictions about
violence can result in either: (1) state of affairs L-no one is harmed, which
occurs when clinicians make correct positive or correct negative predictions of
violence or (2) state of affairs N-a person is harmed by a violent attack follow-
ing what turned out to be a false negative prediction of violence. But consider-
ations of equity require us not to ignore state of affairs M, the harm done a non-
violent person who undergoes needless hospitalization as a result of a false
positive prediction of violence. Considerations of equity and fairness require that,
in gauging the utility that a person ascribes to a false positive judgment about
violence, we ask that person to "universalize" his judgment. We ask him, in oth-
er words, to regard any possible outcome affecting any individual in society as
though it happened to him. An individual's evaluation of the utility of involun-
tary hospitalization should therefore incorporate the notion that he is the one
undergoing hospitalization."'
Actual durations of pre-hearing involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations vary
between jurisdictions and depend on a variety of hard-to-predict factors. Let us
assume, however, that the period of involuntary hospitalization under con-
sideration is three to seven days.6 To find an individual's UFP, we would want
61. Although the requirements just outlined seem obvious to me, I feel obliged to offer
a brief justification. (A complete justification would take me far beyond the intended scope
of this Article.) I am at heart a deontological ethicist, and I view these requirements as
being mandated by the categorical imperative: "Act only on that maxim through which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Immanuel Kant,
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 88 (2d ed 1785, H. J. Paton trans, Harper &
Row, 1964) (emphasis in original). Assigning utilities in the manner described-that is,
requiring all of us to view ourselves as potentially deprived of liberty-also seems
consonant with the spirit of modern contractarian political theory. See, for example, John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11-22 (Harvard, 1971) (explaining that the notion of justice
as fairness dictates that we imagine ourselves to be parties in an "original position," in
which persons choose principles of self-governance from behind a "veil of ignorance").
This is not to say that Rawls would support the scheme outlined in this Article. He
endorses restricting the liberty of mentally ill persons in ways "designed to undo the
unfortunate consequences of the imprudent behavior," so long as "with the development
or the recovery of his rational powers the individual in question will accept our decision
on his behalf and agree with us that we did the best thing for him." Id at 249. He
believes, however, that parties to the original agreement, having "no basis for determining
the probable nature of their society, or their place in it" would "have strong reasons for
being wary of probability calculations if any other course is open to them." Id at 155.
One indeed can argue that the "balancing" scheme being discussed is totally at odds with
my stated preference for a deontological approach to ethical decision-making. However,
given (1) the nature of current commitment laws (which require a determination of a level
of dangerousness and which do not permit involuntarily hospitalizations whose sole basis
is paternalistic (see note 9), (2) this Article's formulation of the decision problem, and (3)
the inevitability of false positive and false negative mistakes, I see no course but to adopt
"probability calculations" as part of a decision-making approach that attempts to balance
optimally the costs of mistakes and the benefits of correct decisions.
For a description of a method for determining how persons would assign utilities
from the standpoint described in the text, see Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad
Psychiatry & L at 185 (cited in note 34).
62. For example, the Ohio statute requires that a hearing be conducted "within five
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to know for what value of y he would be indifferent between (1) being commit-
ted for three to seven days (state of affairs M) and (2) engaging in a lottery in
which he had chance y of not being attacked (state of affairs L, the result of a
true negative decision) and chance (1-y) of experiencing a violent attack (state of
affairs N). L and N have utilities UL = UT = 1 and UN = UrN= 0, and state M
is expected to have a utility intermediate between 1 and 0. By definition, UM =
YUL + (1-3)UN, so UM = UFP= Y.
Obviously, finding y for an individual or a population is a matter for
empirical determination. Here I shall assume that most persons would give Y a
value close to 1 (because they would prefer hospitalization unless the risk of
attack were small), but they would have trouble giving ' a precise value. More-
over, individuals no doubt differ markedly in their feelings about undergoing
involuntary hospitalization and being the victim of a violent attack. There is no
absolute or "right" value for y, since y (and for that matter, all utilities) merely
reflect persons' preferences. Therefore, the value of y, whether for an individual
or for a group of persons, should be described as extending over a range of
values.
Let us suppose that we can be ninety-nine percent certain that 0.9 < Y <
0.999. That is, we are virtually sure that persons would prefer being hospitalized
involuntarily to taking a ten percent chance that they would be the victim of a
serious violent attack, but they would prefer not to be hospitalized if the alterna-
tive were taking a 0.1% risk of being attacked. Let U. = 1-y = 1-Unp. U. then
will be 1/10 to 1/1000 of Up = UrN = 1; that is,
[2] 10-3 < U! <10-1,
with ninety-nine percent probability. Assuming that a population's probability
distribution of U. is log-normal" with mean = 102, we can rewrite the 99%
confidence limits as
[3] U = 10- '.
court days from the day on which the respondent is detained [involuntarily hospitalized]
or an affidavit is filed, whichever occurs first .... [F]or good cause shown, the court may
order a continuance . . . for no more than ten days" from the date of admission or fil-
ing. Ohio Rev Code Ann S 5122.141(B) (Baldwin 1989). In my experience, hearings are
usually held between three and seven days after a patient has been involuntarily hospital-
ized.
63. This distributional assumption is convenient and intuitively sensible when a variable
is constrained to a finite interval. This assumption also is consistent with empirical findings
measuring persons' values for Ux. See Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry
& L at 187, 190 (cited in note 34).
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E. ROC ANALYSIS: A METHOD FOR DESCRIBING PREDICTION ACCURACY1 4
In addition to the utilities just discussed, Equation 1 refers to false and true
positive rates, which are characteristics of the test used to discriminate violent
from non-violent patients. Examination of Figure 1 shows that we could choose
a threshold for the FVT that would allow FPR or TPR to take on any value
between 0 (threshold very high) and 1 (threshold very low). It is therefore
valuable to have an explicit means of relating FPR and TPR to each other and to
the total expected utility.
The interrelationships of these quantities can be given a precise description
through the use of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. Figure 2
contains a ROC graph representing the FVT (the solid curve labeled 2). In a
ROC graph, a test's TPR (sensitivity) is plotted as a function of its FPR
(1-specificity). A full ROC curve provides a pictorial description of diagnostic
performance across a test's entire range of possible thresholds. In Figure 2, rela-
tively strict hospitalization thresholds (corresponding to high FVT scores) are
represented by portions of the curve lying in the lower left corner of ROC space,
and relatively lenient hospitalization thresholds (low FVT scores) are represented
by the upper right portions of the curve. The ROC curve thus displays a com-
mon feature of diagnostic tests: as TPR increases, so does FPR. In other words,
increased sensitivity is purchased at the cost of decreased specificity. Several
64. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis has attained "a central or unifying
position in the process of assessing and using diagnostic tools" in clinical medicine. Mark
H. Zweig and Gregory Campbell, Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) Plots: A
Fundamental Evaluation Tool in Clinical Medicine, 39 Clin Chemistry 561 (1993). My
Medline database search covering the period 1989 to mid-1993 revealed over two hundred
articles about or incorporating ROC methods. The broad range of subjects where ROC
analysis has been used to select the optimal test operating point is described in John A.
Swets, The Science of Choosing the Right Decision Threshold in High-Stakes Diagnostics,
47 Am Psych 522 (1992).
The concepts discussed in this and the following sub-section are developed in more
detail in the following series of articles: Eugene Somoza and Douglas Mossman,
Introduction to Neuropsychiatric Decision Making: Binary Diagnostic Tests, 2 J
Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 297 (1990); Douglas Mossman and Eugene Somoza,
Neuropsychiatric Decision Making: The Role of Disorder Prevalence in Diagnostic Testing,
3 J Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 84 (1991); Eugene Somoza and Douglas Mossman,
Neuropsychiatric Decision Making: Designing Nonbinary Diagnostic Tests, 3 J
Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 197 (1991); Douglas Mossman and Eugene Somoza,
ROC Curves, Test Accuracy, and the Description of Diagnostic Tests, 3 J Neuropsychiatry
& Clin Neurosci 330 (1991); Eugene Somoza and Douglas Mossman, ROC Curves and
the Binormal Assumption, 3 J Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 436 (1991); Douglas
Mossman and Eugene Somoza, Diagnostic Tests and Information Theory, 4 J
Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 95 (1992); Eugene Somoza and Douglas Mossman,
Comparing Diagnostic Tests Using Information Theory: The INFO-ROC Technique, 4 J
Neuropsychiarry & Clin Neurosci 214 (1992); Douglas Mossman and Eugene Somoza,
Balancing Risks and Benefits: Another Approach to Optimizing Diagnostic Tests, 4 J
Neuropsychiatry & Clin Neurosci 331 (1992).
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possible thresholds for the FVT depicted in Figure 1 are marked along the FVT's
ROC curve in Figure 2.
Figure 2 also contains two other ROC curves (dashed lines) that represent
the discrimination capacity of two other hypothetical tests for future violence
whose performances can also be compared in Figure 3. By examining the curves
in Figure 2, we can learn how the relative performance of diagnostic tests can be
evaluated using ROC graphs. One can easily see that, at each FPR, Curve 3 has
a higher TPR than Curves 1 or 2. This is equivalent to saying that, at each level
of specificity, Test 3 is a more sensitive detector of violence than the other two
tests. The test represented by Curve 3 typifies an excellent diagnostic test, in that
its ROC curve rises sharply from the lower left corner (FPR=O,TPR=O) and bends
to the right very near the upper left corner (FPR=O,TPR=1) of the unit square. A
poorly-performing diagnostic test would be represented by a ROC curve that lay
close to a diagonal line running from (FPR=OTPR=O) to (FPR=1,TPR=l) across
the unit square. The FVT's ROC curve represents a fairly good test; the test
represented by Curve 1 is modestly accurate. Readers may find it interesting to
compare the accuracy of the FVT to some radiologic tests: the performance of a
conventional chest x-ray would be represented by a ROC curve lying midway
between Curves 1 and 2;6s a computerized tomographic head scan's accuracy in
detecting disease 6 would be represented by a ROC curve lying slightly above
Curve 2.
E FINDING THE OPTIMAL THRESHOLD
We now return to the problem of operationalizing the hypothetical future
violence test in Figure 1. I noted above that the ROC curves in Figure 2 depict
the performance of the three tests whose performance is also shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 indicates that a test's "quality," i.e., its ability to sort violent from non-
violent patients, is a function of its ability to separate the distributions of the two
groups' test scores. The best test is the one that most separates these two
distributions. It turns out that ROC curves such as those shown in Figure 2 can
be summarized by mathematical indices that describe the shape of test results'
distributions and the separation between the means (the "peaks") of the distribu-
tions. Using these mathematical indices, one can differentiate Equation 1' with
65. Jung-Tsuoe Ho and Robert A. Kruger, Comparison of Dual-Energy and Conven-
tional Chest Radiography for Nodule Detection, 24 Investigative Radiol 861 (1989).
66. Barbara J. McNeil, et al, Paired Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves and the
Effect of History on Radiographic Interpretation, 149 Radiol 75 (1983).
67. The indices referred to are derived from the "binormal assumption" of ROC curve
fitting. For a broad variety of empirical diagnostic data, when (FPR,TPR) pairs associated
with various thresholds are transformed to normal deviates or "z-scores" and are plotted,
the thresholds tend to fall along a straight line of the form
[67-1] Z.rR = BZFPR + A,
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for three tests of differing discriminating ability. The
curves represent tests in which the distribution of the violent population
is offset by 1, 2, or 3 standard deviations from the distribution of the
non-violent population, as shown in fig. 3. The FVT shown in fig. 1 is
represented by the middle curve. Several FVT thresholds are marked
along the middle curve.
respect to the threshold, set this derivative equal to 0, and derive an analytic
solution for the utility-maximizing threshold. For the purposes of this Article, let
us assume that, for a sufficiently large population, the FVT results of violent and
non-violent patients do conform to two normal (bell-shaped or Gaussian)
distributions with different means but equal variances. 8 This means that the ac-
and A is the intercept. See John A. Swets, Forms of Empirical ROCs in Discrimination
and Diagnostic Tasks: Implications for Theory and Measurement of Performance, 99 Psych
Bull 181 (1986). This finding leads to the assumption that, on some monotonic transfor-
mation of the original decision axis, test results conform to two normal distributions
whose standard deviations have the ratio B and whose means are separated by A standard
deviations. The indices A and B thus summarize the performance of a diagnostic test
throughout its entire range of thresholds. For the FVT shown in Figure 1, A = 2 and B
= 1. For additional discussion of the justification and hypothesis testing for the binormal
assumption, see Charles E. Metz, Some Practical Issues of Experimental Design and Data
Analysis in Radiological ROC Studies, 24 Investigative Radiol 234 (1989); James A.
Hanley, The Robustness of the "Binormal" Assumptions Used in Fitting ROC Curves, 8
Med Dec Making 197 (1988).
68. The use of equal variances greatly simplifies the mathematical discussion that
follows, without compromising any of the fundamental conclusions. The more general and
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Fig. 3. Separation of violent and non-violent populations by three differ-
ent Future Violence Tests, whose ROC curves are shown in fig. 2. The
non-violent population (labelled 0) is centered at 40; increasingly accu-
rate FVTs separate the violent population by 1, 2, or 3 standard devia-
tions.
curacy of the FVT can be summarized by a single index A, the distance between
the means of the two groups expressed in units of standard deviation. Let ZFIR
be the normal deviate of the false positive rate of the FVT, and recall that
U,?=UTN=I, UFN=0, and 1-Un = U.. Under these conditions, expected utility EU
in Equation 1' will be maximized when aEUIDZRr = 0. One can show that when
,this is the case:
[4] ZFPR = 1In ([aPr]uJ A
When the threshold is chosen so that ZIR satisfies Equation 4, the future
violence test will be operationalized to allow the ideal balance of correct and
incorrect predictions. To strike this balance, one need only know the base rate
somewhat more complicated case-different means and unequal standard deviations-is




(Pr), the discriminating capacity of the test (represented by A), and the relative
utility of false positive predictions.69
Because the distance in standard deviations between the violent and non-
violent distributions is A, the true and false positive rates for a diagnostic test
will have the relationship ZTPR = ZFPR + A. 7" In both Figure 1 and Figure 3, the
population distributions have standard deviations equal to 10 FVT points.
Thresholds in both figures are easily converted to values of ZFPR using the
formula ZFPR = (40-FVT)+10. The non-violent distribution is centered at FVT =
40, and on the normal deviate scale, the mean of the non-violent population is
(by definition) ZFPR = 0. In Figure 1, the distributions are separated by two
standard deviations, or 20 FVT points, so at FVT = 60, the normal deviate for
the mean of the violent population occurs where ZFPR = [40-60] 10 = -2. Note
finally that the difference between mean FVT scores for the violent and non-
violent populations is 20, and that A = [60-40]+10 = 2. This allows us to
rewrite Equation 4 for FVT*, the FVT score in Figure 1 that yields maximum
utility, as follows:
[4"] FVT = 50 + 51nC [l-Pr]uJ7-r ')
II. The Impact of Uncertainty and Imprecision
A. UNCERTAINTY IN UTILITY
The uncertainty in our judgments about utilities of test outcomes has an
important effect on how certain we can be that we have chosen the best operat-
ing point for a test. A concrete example will illustrate this point. Suppose that
having recognized that we have assigned U. a range of values, we wish to know
in what range of values lies the utility-maximizing threshold for the FVT used to
make decisions covering a specified time period. Assume that we shall be
evaluating emergency room patients for whom the base rate of serious violence
during the time period is 0.4% (i.e., four of one thousand patients act violent-
ly), 71 and the FVT is quite accurate (A = 2) such as the FVT in Figure 1. Using
Equations 4 and 4*, and letting U. = 0.01, we find that the violence prediction
test is optimized when ZFR = -1.456, ZTPR = +0.544, and FVT = 54.6. From a
table of the standard normal distribution, we find that, at this cut-off, FPR =
(1-specificity) = 0.0727, and TPR = sensitivity = 0.707. In other words, about
seventy-one percent of the actually violent individuals would be correctly
classified, and about ninety-three percent of the non-violent ones would be cor-
rectly identified.
69. The full derivation is given in the Appendix.
70. Notice that this is the same as Equation 67-1 in note 67, with B = 1.
71. My reason for choosing this base rate will become clear shortly. See text accom-
panying note 84.
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Equations 2 and 3 express the distributional characteristics and the 99%
confidence limits of Ux, then the 95% confidence limits are
[5] 10 2-76 < Ux -- 10"2 4, or 0.00174 < U.!- 0.0577.72
The 95% confidence interval for the OOP can be determined by substituting
these limits into Equations 4 and 4*, and calculating ZFPR, ZPR,' and the FVT
score. Thus, given our above assumptions, we could be ninety-five percent sure
that
[6] -2.332 < Z,R < -0.579, -0.332 Z!R -+1.421, and 45.8 -FVT < 63.3,
and that
[7] 0.00985 5 FPR < 0.281 and 0.370 < TPR _ 0.921.
One can show that when Pr = 0.004, FPR = 0.0727, and TPR = 0.707, a
FVT will classify about twenty-six non-violent persons incorrectly for every
correctly-classified violent person. This does not imply that the test is inaccu-
rate-indeed, our FVT is, by hypothesis, a good one.'4 The FP:TP ratio is the
result of the test's imperfection coupled with the assumed low base rate of
violence and a preference for involuntary hospitalization over releasing violent
individuals. Notice that our uncertainty about the relative values of outcomes
requires us to tolerate a large variation in acceptable test operating points and
decision outcomes. A clinician who hospitalizes seventy-five non-violent persons
for every violent one may not be making poorer assessments than one whose
ratio is 7:1; they may just be using different operating points within the ranges
described in Equations 6 and 7.75
72. In a normal distribution, ninety-nine percent of the population is contained within
2.576 standard deviations of the mean, and ninety-five percent of the population lies
within 1.96 standard deviations. If Ux is distributed log-normally and we are 99% sure
that 10' : U. -< 10-', the standard deviation of log10U, is 1 + 2.576 = 0.388.
We could calculate other confidence intervals similarly. A 95% confidence level is
the conventional (though entirely arbitrary) point used in statistical inference to accept or
reject hypotheses. See, for example, Wayne W. Daniel, Biostatistics: A Foundation for
Analysis in the Health Sciences 165-200 (John Wiley & Sons, 1983).
73. The relationship between Z, and ZFpR is discussed in note 67.
74. See note 76 and accompanying text (discussing typical accuracy of short-term pre-
dictions of violence).
75. An even more striking comparison involves differences in a clinician's preferred
marginal tradeoff at the mid-point and extremes of the 95% confidence limits. Recall that
this tradeoff represents the number of non-violent patients a clinician would hospitalize to
avoid releasing one actually violent patient (see note 55). When U. = 10-"", the tradeoff
is 17.3; when U. = 10', the tradeoff is 100; and when U. = 10", the tradeoff is 808!
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B. UNCERTAINTY IN BASE RATE
Thus far we have assumed that uncertainty arises only from ambiguity in
assigning values to test outcomes. In fact, error in optimizing the FVT also arises
from uncertainties in estimates of the base rate (Pr) and the accuracy index A. In
my review of several studies of violence prediction, I found that the reported ac-
curacy for short-term predictions (those covering periods of one to seven days)
exhibited accuracies such that 0.34 _5 A _ 1.78.76 Interstudy variation in the
inferred value of A comes, in part, from different study methods. 77 For a given
violence detection instrument, however, one can show that variance in the
accuracy index A can be expected to account for only a small portion of the
variance in ZFPR. 78 For simplicity's sake, I shall ignore variance in accuracy indi-
ces in the following discussion. We shall consider variation in Pr as the sole addi-
tional source of potential error in estimating the FVT's OOP.
To assign a value to Pr, we should recall that most studies report higher
levels of violence during periods shortly after evaluation than during later
periods." If a certain fraction of persons committing their first act of violence
76. See Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 789 tbl 4 (cited in note 3). In
that study, prediction accuracy is described in terms of the area under the ROC curve
(AUC), which is the most widely used ROC index of test accuracy. See, for example, John
A. Swets and Ronald M. Pickett, Evaluation of Diagnostic Systems: Methods from Signal
Detection Theory 31-33 (Academic, 1982). Use of the binormal indices, see note 67 for
definition, allows for the development of expressions for specifying specific thresholds such
as Equation 4 in the text. The relationship between AUC and the binormal ROC indices
is given by
AUC = ( B j
where 4(-) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. In both this paper and
Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 789 (cited in note 3), I use the assumption
that B = 1, so that A may be obtained from AUC using the relationship A = [1-'(AUC)l
x 2.
77. In general, predictions that were derived from past behavior alone (i.e., was the
patient violent just before admission) were more accurate than clinicians' judgments or
properly-evaluated discriminant functions. See Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at
789 tbl 4 (cited in note 3).
78. This is because the error in A for an individual test is generally on the order of
25-50% of its value, whereas the errors in U. and Pr are represented by orders of
magnitude. Curious readers can rework Equation 4 and demonstrate this to themselves.
However, the value of A has a major effect on the impact of errors in U. and Pr on the
OOP. The lower A is, the more uncertainty is produced by a given error in U. and Pr.
See text accompanying note 86, Equations 10-13, and Table 3.
79. See, for example, McNiel and Binder, 144 Am J Psychiatry at 198 (cited in note
15) (finding that 14/101 patients became physically assaultive during first twenty-four
hours of hospitalization and that an additional 3/101 became assaultive on days two or
three); Robert Tillman, The Size of the "Criminal Population": The Prevalence and
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is fixed, then the absolute number of persons committing their first violent act
will decline with time, and the fraction of patients who become violent should
therefore be represented as a curvilinear function of time.80
The daily rates of violence per person shown as powers of 10 in Table 2
were calculated from published data by assuming that a fixed fraction of patients
who had not previously been violent became violent each day. The rates are
expressed as exponentials to emphasize the order-of-magnitude inter-study
variation and for calculational purposes discussed below. The enormous varia-
tion in implicit or reported rates of violence among various psychiatric and non-
psychiatric populations implies that a clinician who wished to estimate the base
rate of violence for an emergency room population would have trouble achieving
better than order-of-magnitude precision."1
Incidence of Adult Arrest, 25 Criminol 561, 568-69, 571-72 (1987) (graphing the fraction
of persons arrested as a function of age); Stuart B. Silver, Marcia I. Cohen, and Michael
K. Spodak, Follow-up after Release of Insanity Acquittees, Mentally Disordered Offenders,
and Convicted Felons, 17 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 387, 397 (1989) (graphing the
cumulative percentage of rearrests of released insanity acquittees and mentally disordered
offenders).
80. A curvilinear function avoids the impossibility of having more than 100% of a
population act violently, which is what would be implied if we assumed that a fixed
fraction (say 1/r) of patients acted violently per time period, and the patients were
followed for more than m periods. The general model I use in this Article assumes that
Pr is a function of the rate of violence, r, over a short time period, and of the number
of periods of observation m:
[80-1] Pr = F(rm) = 1-(1-r)'.
However, if r << 1, then expanding the polynomial on the right side of Equation 80-1
gives us
[80-2] Pr = mr,
which is the assumption used to produce Equation 8 in the text.
One could conceive of other reasonable curvilinear functions to describe Pr. For
example, if one thought that, even after an extended length of time, only a certain
fraction Pro of patients would act violently, one might utilize the relationship
[80-3] Pr = Proml(m + b),
where Pro and b would be empirically-determined constants. The appropriateness of any
particular curvilinear function should be the subject of empirical investigation, but a full
treatment of this topic is not possible here.
81. In an effort to explain the apparent discrepancies in Table 2, one might note that
the studies with the lowest daily rates of violence look at patients in the community (often
following hospitalization) and often rely on arrest data that probably underrepresents
actual rates of violent acts. The studies with highest rates, by contrast, principally examine
behavior of patients who are hospitalized and who therefore may be more disturbed, more
violent, and better observed than if they were living in the community.
To my mind, however, this does little to reduce error in estimating the "true" rate
of violence, because it underscores the ambiguity in establishing the truth about a patient's
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To simplify the following discussion, I shall assume that the fraction of
patients who become violent during a short time period-the "base rate" or
prevalence (Pr) for the time period - is a linear multiple of the daily rate of vio-
lence (10D) and the number of days (N) over which the patients are observed.12
Thus
[8] Pr = N-10' .
If we assume that the 99% confidence interval for the daily rate of psychiat-
ric patients' violent acts was 10" per patient per day, then D ± s.d."3 = -3.0 ±
0.39. (Note that this range estimate is conservative.) Suppose that we can narrow
the substantial societal disagreement about the number of days over which
professionals' predictions should apply to a 99% confidence interval of one to
seven days. 4 Then N ± s.d. = 4.0 ± 1.16 days, and our central estimate of the
behavior. Years of work in public and private hospitals has taught me that what gets
interpreted as "violence," and the likelihood of aggressive outbursts by any particular
hospitalized patient, clearly are functions of the ward "atmosphere" or "milieu," that is,
the availability, maturity, and equanimity of the nursing staff, the relationships among staff
members of various disciplines, the quality of physician leadership, the pleasantness of the
surroundings, medication usage, and the number of highly disturbed patients on the ward.
For more systematic empirical confirmation, see Miriam Sheridan, et al, Precipitants of
Violence in a Psychiatric Inpatient Setting, 41 Hosp & Community Psychiatry 776, 776-
77, 779 (1990) (finding that behavior leading to restraint was "more likely to relate to
external situations than to the patient's internal psychiatric symptoms," that "[t]he most
frequent external event that precipitated restraint was patient-staff conflict," and that "in
only two [of seventy-three restrained] patients were [] hallucinations directly related to the
events leading to restraint").
All of this is to suggest that not all the events (even if they are termed "assaults")
recorded as acts of violence by hospitalized patients are serious (or serious enough to justi-
fy taking away someone's liberty), and some may be brought about by events associated
with, or patients' responses to, being hospitalized and being around other disturbed pa-
tients. Moreover, the high rate of violence in the two weeks before hospitalization reported
by Binder and McNiel, 14 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 131 (cited in note 4), likely
reflects causes of or desires for hospitalization, and may not be representative of what
patients would do had they been left at home. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable
to require that only behavior severe enough to generate an arrest be counted as vio-
lent-especially given the biases associated with arrest data. See, for example, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Reporting Crimes to the Police 1 (US Dept of Justice, 1985) (finding that
crimes against younger persons and offenses that do no involve injury are relatively
underreported).
The estimates used in the text are the best I can produce after much contemplation
of both the ambiguity of published data and the ambiguity of the moral issues involved.
Perhaps my discussion will lead other investigators to efforts to reduce this particular
source of uncertainty further. For additional discussion of this issue in the context of
assessing predictions of violence, see Monahan, Clinical Prediction at 52-56 (cited in note
12).
82. For justification, see note 80.
83. "s.d." = standard deviation.




Calculated Rates of Violence (per Person per Day) in
Psychiatric Populations
Type/Criterion of Violence
Cocozza and Steadman' (Baxtrom)assaults
Thomberry and Jacoby2 (Dixon) assaults
Klassen and O'Connor3  arrests
Klassen and O'Connor3  readmitted or arrested
Zitrin, et a14  arrests for index offenses
Zitrin, et a14  arrests, violent offenses
Rofman, et als  battery
Kozol, Boucher, and Garofab6  serious assault
Steadman 7 (Patuxent) violent crime
McNeil and Binder' physical assault
Cocozza, Melich, and Steadman' violent crime
Hiday10  arrests for any offense
Lidz, Mulvey, and Gardner" hit, strike, or serious violence
Link, Andrews, and Cullen12  weapons use
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Tardiff, Psychiatric Times at 13 (cited in note 23) ("I believe that we can predict the
short-term potential for violence using a model analogous to that used for predicting
suicide potential. 'Short-term' refers to no more than a few days to a week . . ").
However, there is no reason to think that the general public agrees. See, for example,
Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiat & L at 187 (cited in note 34) (finding
that 46/217 undergraduates thought psychiatrists should have no liability for released
patients' violence, but 29/217 thought they should be liable for 180 days or more).
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the base rate is Pr = N.10' = 0.004.
To calculate the variance in the base rate estimate, var(Pr), we can use the
method of differentials:"5
[9] var(Pr) =(dPr)2  (Pr (D)+ D-var(N)
arD) +- vrN
= (N.10".(lnl0))2 var(D) + (10") 2var(N)
If [var(D)] = s.d.(D) = 0.39 and [var(N)] = s.d.(N) = 1.16, then var(Pr) =
0.0000142.
To estimate the variance in ZFpR, we again use the method of differentials:
[10] var(ZPR,) =(dZ..R) 2  J var(U )+Z a(
= 1 var(U) + A.(1-Pr).Prvar(Pr)
When A = 2, U = 0.01, Pr = 0.004, and U., D, and N have the 99% confidence
intervals given above, one can show that var(ZpR) = 0.4234.
C. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR THE DECISION THRESHOLD
One can use Equations 4 and 4* and the finding that var(ZpR) = 0.4234 to
show that the 95% confidence interval for the FVT's OOP would be
[11] ZpR ± 1.96x[var(ZIR)] = ZpR ± 1.96x[0.4234] = -1.456 ± 1.275.
Therefore,
[12] -2.73 < ZFpR < -0.181, -0.731 < ZTp, < +1.82,
and 41.3 < FVT < 67.3,
and
[13] 0.0032 < FPR < 0.428, and 0.232 _< TPR < 0.966.
85. Regina C. Elandr-Johnson and Norman L. Johnson, Survival Models and Data
Analysis (John Wiley & Sons, 1980). Equations 9 and 10 are derived from squaring the
first terms in the Taylor series expansion. See Angus E. Taylor and W. Robert Mann,
Advanced Calculus 222-24 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed 1972). Equations 9 and 10 do not
include "cross terms" because the covariances of D and N and U. and Pr can be ex-
pected to be zero.
Dangerousness Decisions 125
Thus far we have examined the effect of error on operationalizing a fairly
accurate test, where A = 2. As was noted earlier, 6 however, studies of violence
prediction suggest that accuracy usually falls well below this level. If A = 1, and
Pr, U, D, and N are unchanged, the 95% confidence int~rval for the OOP is
expanded, and Equations 11-13 become:
[11a] ZF ± 1.96x[var(ZR)]u = -1.412 + 2.551;
[12a] -3.96 _ Z p -< +1.139, -2.96 <Z.p <- +2.239,
and 28.6 _ FVT _ 79.6;
[13a] 0.000038 _ FPR 0.872, and 0.0015 : TPR _ 0.987.
Table 3 shows how dangerousness decisions for a population of 100,000
would be affected by moving the hospitalization threshold across the 95%
confidence ranges when A = 1 or 2, assuming 400 (0.4%) of patients actually
were violent. For the less accurate test, virtually any cut-off falls within the range
of acceptable thresholds, including one that detects only 0.15% of the violent
persons and another that deems eighty-seven percent of the non-violent persons
violent. The 95% confidence range for the more accurate test (where A = 2)
requires identification of at least twenty-three percent of the violent individuals,
that is, the twenty-three percent having the highest scores on the FVT. In other
words, very accurate predictors who miss seventy-seven percent of violent
individuals would be performing within the 95% confidence interval; they would
also be misidentifying 3.4 non-violent individuals for each correct prediction of
violence. Equally accurate but more "cautious" predictors would misidentify 110
non-violent individuals for each correctly identified violent individual, and yet
they also would be operating within the confidence limits. Notice that even at
this high FP:TP ratio, these cautious predictors would still miss 3.5% of the
violent individuals.
III. Discussion
The following sections suggest several points about the description, evalua-
tion, accuracy, and uses of violence predictions.
A. DESCRIBING PREDICTION ACCURACY
1. Use of ROC methods.
In future studies, the accuracy of violence predictions should be described
using ROC methods.8 7 This Article demonstrates two important reasons for
86. See note 76 and accompanying text.
87. For a full treatment of this methodological issue, see Mossman, 62 J Consulting




Acceptable Decision Thresholds, FVT Scores, and Numbers of Correct
and Incorrect Predictions of Violence When U ± s.d. = 10.2 = 0.39, Pr =
N.10D° N :t s.d. = 4 ± 1.16, and D ± s.d. = -3±0.39; Upper Limits,
Means, and Lower Limits of the 95% Confidence Intervals When
A = 1 and A =2.
100,000 Evaluated Patients
99,600 Non-Violent 400 Violent
FVT True False True False FP:TP
A ZFPR w P i tv gatives Ratio
2 -2.73 67.3 99,281 319 93 307 3.4
-1.456 54.6 92,363 7,237 283 117 25.6
-0.181 41.8 56,971 42,629 386 14 110
1 -3.962 79.6 99,596 4 0.6 399.4 6.7
-1.412 54.1 91,734 7,866 136 264 57.8
+1.138 28.6 12,705 86,895 395 5 220
this. First, ROC analysis captures one of the essential features of violence pre-
dictions-the trade-offs between sensitivity and specificity inherent in those
predictions. It thereby provides an assessment of intrinsic accuracy that is
independent of biases favoring sensitivity (identification of violent individuals) or
specificity (identification of non-violent individuals). Second, ROC methods
provide a means for analyzing the relationship between sensitivity and specificity
distinct from preferences for certain outcomes and from the prevalence of
violence."8
2. Misinterpretation of prediction research.
The oft-repeated observation that clinicians' predictions of violence are
wrong two-thirds to ninety-five percent of the time89 is misleading, because it
ignores the distinction between intrinsic accuracy and a preference for certain
types of results-usually a bias in favor of detecting or preventing violence.90
88. Readers interested in a more detailed explanation of these general issues should
consult my articles cited in note 64 and Swets and Pickett, Evaluation of Diagnostic
Systems at 15-45 (cited in note 76).
89. See, for example, Monahan, Clinical Prediction at 48 tbl 3 (cited in note 12)
(finding that fifty-nine percent to eighty-six percent of predictions that patients would be
violent were wrong); Monahan, 141 Am J Psychiatry at 11 (cited in note 13) (characteriz-
ing such statements as "ACLU-type evaluations of the field" of violence prediction); Bruce
Ennis and Richard Emery, The Rights of Mental Patients 20 (Avon, 1978) (finding that
"predictions of dangerous behavior are wrong about 95% of the time"); Amicus brief of
the American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v Estelle, 463 US 880 (1983); Barefoot,
463 US at 916 (Blackmun dissenting).
90. As Monahan, Clinical Prediction at 48 tbl 3 (cited in note 12), shows, clinicians'
predictions of non-violence are correct most of the time. For an excellent discussion of this
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The imp6rtance of this distinction was demonstrated in the previous section,
where we found that, if experiencing needless commitment is deemed a much
lesser harm than experiencing violence, there ought to be a high ratio of false to
true positive violence predictions.91 When a low base rate of violence is coupled
with a preference for protecting the public, then even the use of a very accurate
FVT should yield many incorrect predictions of violence for each correct one.
3. Predictions are modestly accurate.
Re-examining earlier and "second generation " ' studies of violence predic-
tion suggests that clinicians are able to distinguish violent from non-violent
individuals with a modest degree of accuracy.93 Recent studies have shown a
higher fraction of correct predictions than earlier reports, 4 but only because the
base rate of violence was much higher.'5 Ofttimes, statistical methods have
appeared to be more accurate than clinical methods, but only because these
"predictions" were based on retrospective analyses of data, using "prediction"
and other ways that prediction research has been misinterpreted, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Pro-
cess, 85 Mich L Rev 510, 539-46 (1986). In addition to the problems discussed by Pro-
fessor Alschuler, a good deal of confusion has resulted from authors' ambiguous or
inconsistent use of epidemiological terminology. For example, in Monahan, Clinical
Prediction at 48 (cited in note 12), the term "percent false positive" (%FP) refers to the
likelihood that a prediction of violence will be incorrect (%FP = 100 x {FP + [FP + TP]);
in Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 103 (cited in note 6), the term "false positive rate" (FPR)
refers to the number of false positive predictions divided by the sum of the false positive
and true negative predictions (FPR = FP + [FP + TN]). In this Article, I use the same
definition of FPR as Otto, and I use the FP:TP ratio to refer to the notion that Monahan
was addressing. For further discussion, see Stephen D. Hart, Christopher D. Webster, and
Robert J. Menzies, A Note on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 L &
Human Beh 695, 697 (1993).
91. The conclusion is premised on the notion that it is legitimate to attempt to balance
deprivations of liberty with the harm they prevent. See note 61 and accompanying text.
For alternative views, see Henry J. Steadman, The Right Not to Be a False Positive:
Problems in the Application of the Dangerousness Standard, 52 Psychiatric Q 81, 84-86,
95-98 (1980) (arguing that false positive rates exceed any accepted criminal evidentiary
standards and must be the subject of additional policy analysis); Leslie T. Wilkins, Current
Aspects of Penology: Directions for Corrections, 118 Proc Am Phil Soc 235 (1974)
(arguing that for persons without a history of violence, no false positives should be
tolerated).
92. For reviews and discussion, see generally Monahan, 141 Am J Psychiatry at 10
(cited in note 13); Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 103 (cited in note 6); Mossman, 62 J
Consulting & Clin Psychology at 783 (cited in note 3) (discussing distinction between first-
and second-generation studies).
93. See Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 787, 789 tbls 3-4 (cited in note
3).
94. See, for example, McNiel and Binder, 144 Am J Psychiatry at 198 (cited in note
15) (finding that sixty-one percent to seventy-one percent of predictions were correct);
Klassen and O'Connor, 12 L & Human Beh at 153 (cited in note 38) (finding that
eighty-five percent of classifications were correct).
95. Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 787 tbl 3 (cited in note 3).
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equations tailored to that data. Where cross-validation has been used to assess
statistical techniques, their performance appears comparable to clinical judg-
ments.96
4. Criticizing clinicians' judgments.
These observations should not allow us to lose sight of an important
implication of the decision-making model described above: even if clinicians
could agree on the best method for assessing violence, almost all decisions (for
example, to hospitalize involuntarily, to warn, or to release from custody) based
on judgments about the likelihood of future violence should be deemed accept-
able. This is the case not because such decisions are likely to be wrong, nor
because clinicians utterly lack ability to assess dangerousness. Rather, the task of
judging whether a decision was made incorrectly is clouded by our collective
ambiguity and disagreement about the value of right and wrong decisions and
the time periods over which those decisions should apply.9
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICIAN LIABILITY
Let me clarify this last point by asking the reader to imagine a lawsuit
brought against a psychiatrist by someone who was injured by a patient seven
days after the patient had been seen for an emergency room evaluation. The
plaintiff claims the patient, who had psychotic symptoms and seemed hostile,
should have been deemed dangerous and involuntarily hospitalized. Let us
imagine testimony by two experts who are honest and objective, who agree with
the defendant on how violence should be predicted (all three use a F"T of
typical accuracy [A = 1]), but who exemplify the moral uncertainty described in
previous sections. Let us also suppose that the jury is comprised of honest, ob-
jective citizens unswayed by hindsight bias,9" irrational fears of the mentally
ill,99 or desire to compensate victims.
96. Id at 789 tbl 4.
97. Thus, this Article has provided a mathematical justification for Tardiff's belief that
courts expect psychiatrists to collect data and give serious consideration to violence poten-
tial, but do not expect dangerousness decisions to be right all the time. Tardiff, Psychiatric
Times at 13 (cited in note 23). But this Article calls into question the reasonableness of
this expectation: if the use of almost any decision threshold would be acceptable, why
bother gathering data or letting dangerousness play a role in clinical decision-making?
98. See note 32 and the sources cited therein.
99. "Mental patients are feared, in part because they are thought to be violent."
Charles W. Lidz, Edward P. Mulvey, and William Gardner, The Accuracy of Predictions
of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007, 1007 (1993) (citation omitted). See also Henry
J. Steadman and Joseph J. Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions
of the Criminally Insane, 41 Pub Op Q 523 (1978). Several years ago, however, Henry
Steadman pointed out that research data supported public fears, and that mental health
professionals should not attempt "to assuage prospective neighbors of a hostel [for
psychiatric patients] by assuring them that mental patients are less dangerous statistically
than their present neighbors." Henry J. Steadman, Critically Reassessing the Accuracy of
Public Perceptions of the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill, 22 J Health & Soc Beh 310,
Dangerousness Decisions 129
The expert retained by the plaintiff argues that the patient displayed several
features indicative of future violence, that the patient scored 55 on the FVT, and
that hospitalization for potential violence should occur when a patient's score
exceeds 50. This witness acknowledges that this cut-off yields a large number of
needless hospitalizations, but argues that the rate of violence among psychiatric
patients is higher than that of the general population, and that psychiatrists have
an obligation to use their legal authority in this risk-averse manner.
A defense expert agrees that the patient scored 55 but argues that this
implies the patient should not have been hospitalized because the appropriate
FVT cut-off is 60. The defense expert believes that dangerousness assessments are
valid for only a short time horizon (i.e., one to two days), that the base rate of
violence is lower than that stated by the plaintiff's expert, and that clinicians
should attend to the deprivation of liberty attendant to involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. He also points out that reasonable people disagree about these issues and
that by not hospitalizing the patient, the defendant used a decision strategy that
lay well within the limits of what he could expect his profession and society
rationally to endorse.
Knowing that the 95% confidence limits for the FVT's proper cut-off are
described by Equation 4 and Table 3, sensible jurors should conclude that most
decisions about future dangerousness ought to be acceptable. Because a broad
range of decision thresholds is reasonable, jurors might feel they should adopt a
position concerning professional judgment analogous to the Supreme Court's
stance in Youingberg v Romeo0 0 concerning the constitutionality of such judg-
ments: so long as they are making a professionally-based 1' judgment about
314 (1981).
As was noted in note 1, recent reports find that ceteris paribus, persons with
psychotic symptoms are more violent than other persons. However, the contribution of
such symptoms to the likelihood of acting violently is quite small compared to socio-
demographic factors, such as age, income, race, sex, and education, and the contribution
of substance abuse. See Link, Andrews, and Cullen, 57 Am Soc Rev at 290 (cited in note
1); John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47
Am Psych 511, 519 (1992).
100. 457 US 307, 323 (1982) (holding that in institutional settings, decisions by
professionals violate constitutional rights only if "the decision by the piofessional is such
a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment").
101. That is, a judgment based on "legitimate," relevant criteria. Jurors who accepted
this principle might find that a doctor who was bribed to make a decision not to
hospitalize had not exercised "professional" judgment and therefore might be liable in tort
for damages resulting from the decision. For a recent discussion of courts' efforts to define
departures from professional judgment under the Youngberg standard, see Susan Stefan,
What Constitutes Departure from Professional Judgment?, 17 Ment & Phys Disab L Rptr
207 (1993). Professor Stefan examines the impact (and, in her view, misapplication) of the
professional judgment standard in Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts":




violence, psychiatrists should not be liable for their prediction errors (save,
perhaps, in the grossest circumstances, for example, failing to deem dangerous a
blatantly psychotic person who enters the emergency room firing a gun)." 2 Of
course, after learning that the uncertainties in an ideal prediction process still
allow for a huge range of variability in decision-making, jurors might wonder
why the law permits mental health professionals to make any dangerousness-
based commitment decisions. The jurors might realize, however, that given the
nature of current commitment laws, psychiatrists working in emergency rooms
(and other settings) cannot avoid making decisions based on their beliefs about
likelihood of future violence, no matter how questionable those decisions may
be. 10
3
102. As Professor Perlin pointed out in a personal communication, "the ambulance at-
tendant, the gift shop host(ess), and Alex and Julie [Professor Perlin's pre-teen children]
could figure this out too. . . ." Letter from Michael Perlin, Professor, New York Law
School, to Douglas Mossman, Professor, Wright State University (Jan 10, 1994) (on file
with author). Although one might argue that psychiatrists ought to have an advantage in
predicting violence because they have expertise in detecting mental symptoms, there is no
evidence to support this. Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych at 783 (cited in note
3). This Article, it should be noted, makes an argument different from the "best judgment
rule" which has served in some jurisdictions to shield a psychiatrist from malpractice
liability "for a mere error of judgment, provided [the psychiatrist] does what he thinks is
best after careful examination." Littleton v Good Samaritan Hospital, 39 Ohio St 3d 86,
529 NE2d 449, 457 (Ohio 1988).
Under such a 'psychotherapist judgment rule,' the court would not allow liability to
be imposed on therapists for simple errors in judgment. Instead, the court would
examine the 'good faith, independence and thoroughness' of a psychotherapist's
decision not to commit a patient. . . . Factors in reviewing such good faith include
the competence and training of the reviewing psychotherapists, whether the relevant
documents and evidence were adequately, promptly and independently reviewed,
whether the advice or opinion of another therapist was obtained, whether the
evaluation was made in light of the proper legal standards for commitment, and
whether other evidence of good faith exists.
Id at 458 (citing Currie v United States, 644 F Supp 1074, 1083 (MD NC 1986)). See
also Schrempf v State, 66 NY2d 289, 487 NE2d 883 (NY 1985) (holding that a state is
not liable for the results of psychiatrist's reasonable but erroneous decision not to commit
patient); Soutear v United States, 646 F Supp 524,
536 (ED Mich 1986) ("a psychiatrist will not be held liable for his patient's violent
behavior simply because be failed to predict it accurately") (emphasis in original), quoting
Davis v Lbim, 124 Mich App 291, 301, 335 NW2d 481 (1983).
The language in Littleton assumes that even though clinicians thoroughly and con-
scientiously review available data, they will make errors in commitment decisions (i.e.,
release violent patients) because they are imperfect predictors despite their expertise.
Littleton, 529 NE2d at 457. This Article suggests that professional expertise should have
little impact on the acceptability of dangerousness decisions, because the ambiguity in the
moral judgments we attach to the consequences of those decisions overwhelms the at-best-
trivial contribution of expertise to prediction accuracy.
103. I am not here referring to psychiatrists' need or desire to avoid Tarasoff liability,
discussed in notes 16-20 and the accompanying text. I simply mean that following any
emergency room encounter, a psychiatrist can either admit a patient involuntarily or not.
(If the psychiatrist does not admit the patient involuntarily, the patient may be admitted
voluntarily or released, but the patient then is not an involuntarily-hospitalized patient.)
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C. ASSUMPTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
A major issue-one left largely unaddressed in my discussion-involves the
need to use actual numerical values to obtain "real" results about decision
thresholds, error rates, and variances. As noted above, persons' preferences and
utilities and the relevant time period over which predictions should apply are, for
the most part, empirical matters and must reflect a social consensus about the
role of mental health professionals in ensuring public well-being and safeguard-
ing patients' civil liberties. This Article suggests an important role for empirical
studies that would help gauge the actual distribution of outcome utilities among
various populations,'04 as well as specific professional or legal guidance as to
the relevant time period for which clinicians should be deemed responsible for
their decisions about future dangerousness. Setting precise guidelines for the time
period over which predictions should apply would decrease clinicians' uncertain-
ty about their responsibility; indeed, this Article allows one to make an estimate
of how great this decrease would be.'
In the absence of such guidance, this discussion has utilized what I believe
are very conservative estimates of the uncertainties associated with the variables
that make up Equation 5.10 A large disparity in outcome valuations should
come as no surprise, for it reflects the disparity in valuations already expressed
in published commentary on civil commitment. This commentary includes the
views of those mental health professionals who see treatment of mental disorders
as an inherent good, who know that involuntary hospitalization is often the only
means of providing treatment to seriously disabled persons,' and who realize
that they are the ones held liable for their patients' violent acts. It also includes
constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and mental health advocates who view
involuntary hospitalization as, first and foremost, a revocation of liberty that is
justifiable only as an expression of limited state police power,"8 that is likely
Even if a clinician never thinks about one of these mutually-exclusive options during a
clinical encounter (for example, when a clinician briefly sees an obviously-stable patient
presenting himself to an emergency room for a medication refill because the mental health
center is closed), one of these two options must be exercised.
104. See Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 181 (cited in note 34).
105. A precise time period would eliminate the contribution to uncertainty from the
variable N in Equations 8-10. Of course, this would still leave considerable uncertainty
due to the broad range of possible values for U. and D.
106. Mossman and Hart, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L at 187 (cited in note 34),
showed that even in very homogeneous populations, perceived ranges for duration of
liability and for the relative utilities of false positive and false negative decisions were
orders of magnitude larger than the ranges used in deriving Equations 11-13 and 11a-13a.
One must conclude that people differ greatly about the magnitude of mental health
professionals' responsibility for patients' acts and about the desirability of involuntary
hospitalization as a means for protecting the public.
107. See, for example, Alan Stone, Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Com-
mitment: A Reply to Durham and LaFond, 5 Yale L & Policy Rev 412 (1987).
108. See, for example, Mary L. Durham and John Q. LaFond, The Empirical Conse-
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to be over-used absent strict safeguards,' and that should not necessarily
imply a committed person's treatment with pharmacotherapy."'
The present attempt to provide a mathematical framework for involuntary
hospitalization views such hospitalization as the outgrowth of a policy that treats
patients as a population about whom decisions are made, and thus differs from
an approach to hospitalization decisions that assumes that each patient can be
evaluated under unique circumstances. My treatment of involuntary hospitaliza-
tion has required, in addition to assumptions about empirical matters, assump-
tions about what the nature of the decision process should be. I have assumed
that for a patient who poses no threat to himself, the justification for involuntary
hospitalization derives solely from the desire to prevent harm to others,' and
I have ignored entirely the closely-linked issues of mentally ill persons' amenabil-
ity and ability to recognize their need for treatment."' I have assumed that
making a dangerousness decision involves making a determination that a
patient's characteristics exceed a certain threshold;"' the threshold is derived
quences and Policy Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Com-
mitment, 3 Yale L & Policy Rev 395, 431 (1985).
109. Id. See also Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case against Involun-
tary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 Cal L Rev 54, 67-79 (1982).
110. For a summary of the rationale behind "right-to-refuse-treatment" litigation, see
Perlin, Mental Disability Law §5 5.01-5.69 (cited in note 9). See also Rogers v Commis-
sioner, Dept of Mental Health, 390 Mass 489, 458 NE2d 308 (1983) (holding that the
involuntary commitment of a mental patient is not a determination that he is incompetent
to make treatment decisions).
111. In practice, clinicians would base admission decisions on their assessment of the
potential for harm to both self and others. Treating just the subject of violence simplifies
discussion. But as I point out in notes 122-30 and the accompanying text, I suspect that
many of the same problems with establishing a threshold of "dangerousness to others"
would be found in a similar effort to define a threshold of "dangerousness to self" for
purposes of involuntary hospitalization.
112. Several proposed models for commitment law reform have suggested that statutes
should incorporate incompetence and/or availability of effective treatment. See, for example,
Alan A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition 69, 83-89 (Natl Inst of
Mental Health, 1975); Clifford D. Stromberg and Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 Harv J Leg 275 (1983). Although commentators
have been concerned that adoption of such statutes might lead to increased use and abuse
of commitment, see Durham and LaFond, 3 Yale L & Policy Rev at 395 (cited in note
108), empirical studies suggest this might not be the case. See Steven K. Hoge, Paul S.
Appelbaum, and Alexander Greer, An Empirical Comparison of the Stone and Dan-
gerousness Criteria for Civil Commitment, 146 Am J Psychiatry 170, 173 (1989) (finding
that Stone's criteria prove to be more restrictive); and Miller, 149 Am J Psychiatry at
1380, 1383 (cited in note 9) (finding that changes in commitment statutes have had
minimal practical impact on rates of commitment).
113. See notes 19-20. In an important criticism of this assumption, Dr. Marshall
Ginsburg has suggested that my "threshold"-based analysis is entirely irrelevant to the type
of hospitalization decisions that clinicians operating under the laws of many states are
supposed to make. Professor Marshall Ginsburg, conversation with author, 30 Oct 1991.
He cites Ohio Rev Code 5 5122.01(B)(2) as permitting clinicians to hospitalize mentally
ill persons who pose "a substantial risk of physical harm to others as manifested by
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from a mathematical computation that incorporates base rates, test characteris-
tics, and the utility associated with correct and incorrect decisions.114 I have
assumed that any prediction instrument will be imperfect in that on some
monotonic transformation of the instrument's decision axis non-violent and vio-
lent populations will form overlapping, readily-characterizable distributions."'5
I have assumed that rates of violence can be characterized as well." 6 I have
assumed that under the best circumstances, prediction mistakes are inevitable,
and that the task of the decision-maker is to balance mistakes in a fair and equi-
table manner. I have assumed that this balancing ideally is achieved by a policy
or strategy that maximizes expected utility, where utility is defined so as to take
into account our diversity of views about the value of individual liberty and the
need to preserve public safety.17
All these assumptions are intended to have some normative power. The
hypothetical decision process I have described seems preferable to ones that fail
evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, evidence of recent threats that
place another in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm, or other
evidence of present dangerousness. . . ." Id (emphasis added). Thus, Dr. Ginsburg argues,
Ohio law expects clinicians simply to "obtain evidence" concerning a patient's recent
actions, rather than decide (as this Article assumes) whether any particular decision
threshold was exceeded. Id.
I offer three counterarguments. First, commitment laws in several states are much
less specific and seem to require threshold-based thinking. See, for example, 405 Ill Rev
Comp Star 5/1-119(1) (West 1993) (authorizing involuntary hospitalization when a patient
is "mentally ill and . . . because of his illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon himself or another in the near future" [emphasis added]). Second, the
Ohio statute does not limit what might constitute "other evidence of present dangerous-
ness." Ohio Rev Code Ann S 5122.01 (Baldwin 1989). Presumably, a clinician could
adduce as evidence a host of demographic factors-age, sex, socioeconomic status, and
substance abuse-that are clearly associated with violence, see Swanson, et al, 41 Hosp &
Community Psychiatry at 769 tbl 7 (cited in note 1), as well as clinical findings that have
been associated with violence. For examples and discussions of such findings, see Stephen
H. Dinwiddie and Sean Yutzy, Dangerous Delusions? Misidentification Syndromes and
Professional Negligence, 21 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 513 (1993) (suggesting that
professional literature has linked certain types of delusional syndromes with violence, but
that this link is a statistical artifact). Third, even in states, such as Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin, that make recent "overt acts" necessary conditions for involuntary hospitaliza-
tion, there is still room for interpretation and clinical discretion-i.e., threshold analy-
ses-concerning the significance of such acts for future conduct. See 50 Pa Stat 5
4405(a)(2) (Purdon 1993) ("The acts or threats which give cause to believe the person to
be mentally disabled and in need of immediate care are overt, demonstrate a clear and
present danger to self or others. . . ."); Wis Stat S S1.20(1)(a)2b (1993) (" . . . by
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical
harm to them, as eiidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical
harm. .. ").
114. See Equation 4 and text accompanying note 69.
115. This is the standard "binormal" assumption of ROC analysis. See notes 67-68, the
accompanying text, and Figures 1 and 3.
116. See notes 79-84, accompanying text, and Table 2.
117. See notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
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to acknowledge the inevitability of mistakes, or that rely on personal moral
views, clinical lore, availability heuristics, unconscious race and class biases, " '
correlations between violence and pathology whose predictive power is
unquantified," 9 or fears about how a mistake would look in retrospect. 2
To properly defend all these assumptions would require discussion far
beyond the scope of this Article. Mentioning them here only helps emphasize
that in judging dangerousness decisions, assumptions about values-either mine
or better ones-are necessary. Mathematical approaches to decision problems
provide a vehicle for helping us make such assumptions known to ourselves as
well as others.
D. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
I have confined this discussion to decisions made by mental health profes-
sionals about violence that their patients might do to third parties. One can
readily appreciate that similar imprecisions and problems would frustrate efforts
to evaluate clinical decisions involving dangerousness to others in other con-
texts, 12 or to evaluate decisions about dangerousness to oneself, where similar
moral uncertainties about the values of right and wrong judgments, base rates,
and time frames no doubt exist.
22
118. For a summary of these phenomena as they affect decision-making about involun-
tary hospitalization and civil commitment, see Perlin, 47 U Miami L Rev at 640-89 (cited
in note 9).
119. For example, Tardiff, Psychiatric Times at 13 (cited in note 23), provides one of
many currently-available, excellent summaries of the dozens of factors that scientific studies
have shown to increase the risk of violence. The problem for clinicians, however, is that
they almost always have no way of knowing how much each of these factors increase risk
of violence, and they have no simple way to mathematically combine all these varying
factors into anything beyond a vague, global judgment of risk. And even if clinicians could
integrate all of this information and calculate risks precisely, the present Article has shown
that there is no agreement-and there may never be any agreement-about what level of
risk should trigger a particular decision. Well-intended efforts such
as Tardiff's may actually perpetuate the notion that psychiatrists can offer courts and
society something more useful than what any intelligent member of the public might
contribute.
120. See, for example, Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and
Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry & L 131, 137 (1991); Barefoot, 463 US at 922 n 4 (discussing
the fear of under-predicting violence as determinant of psychiatrists' behavior); Francois v
Henderson, 850 F2d 231, 234 (5th Cir 1988) (testifying doctor conceded that he
"hedged" testimony "because he did not want to be criticized should [the patient] be re-
leased and then commit a criminal act").
121. Such contexts include decisions about bail, waiver to adult court of accused
juveniles, parole decisions, decisions to release "sexual psychopaths" and persons found not
guilty by reason of insanity, and decisions about imposing capital punishment. See Shah,
33 Am Psych at 225 (cited in note 35), and Norval Morris and Marc Miller, Predictions
of Dangerousness, 6 Crime & Justice 1, 4 nn 2, 7-10 (1985).
122. Moreover, even using retrospective statistical models in a population at far-above-
average risk for suicide, it was not possible to select out a group for which suicide
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I should also note that such uncertainties probably affect a host of legal
issues that do not involve mental health professionals or psychiatric treatment.
In a series of cases relying on Justice Harlan's concurrence to In re Winship,'
the Supreme Court has justified its view concerning procedural requirements or
allocation of burden of proof in various types of litigation using a utilitarian,
interest-balancing approach that reflects its views of the possibility of erroneous
outcomes and its "assessment of the comparative social disutility of each" out-
come.124 The Court has held that in cases where Bill of Rights provisions are
not applicable, procedural "due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors": private interests, risk of error, and governmental interests.'2S
The Court has applied this test in a variety of decisions involving the right to
counsel in parental status termination proceedings,2 6 the burden of proof in
findings of permanent parental neglect,12 1 the constitutionality of pre-trial
detention of juveniles,22 and the constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform
Act. 29
Once again, it would take me far beyond this Article's scope to discuss even
minimally the merits of this approach to legal decision-making. I can only point
out here that the difficulties we found in defining a threshold for a relatively
clear-cut clinical decision with only a limited number of outcomes would be
greatly magnified in the less well-defined and much more complex circumstances
dealt with in the above-mentioned Supreme Court cases.'
reached even a fifty percent likelihood. Rise L. Goldstein, et al, The Prediction of Suicide:
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Predictive Value of a Multivariate Model Applied to Suicide
among 1,906 Patients with Affective Disorders, 48 Arch Gen Psychiatry 418, 420 (1991).
123. 397 US 358, 368 (1970) (Harlan concurring).
124. Id at 371.
125. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976) (determining proper procedures for
establishing initial and continued entitlement to disability benefits under the Social Security
Act).
126. Lassiter v Dept of Social Services, 452 US 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause does not require appointment of counsel in
every proceeding).
127. Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that due process requires
a state to support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence).
128. Scball v Martin, 467 US 253, 256-57 (1984) (holding that a New York statute
permitting pre-trial detention of juveniles does not violate Due Process Clause).
129. United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 741 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of
the Bail Reform Act, 18 USC S§ 3141-3156 (1982 & 1985 Supp II), which allows pre-
trial detention without bond for persons accused of certain crimes). The Bail Reform Act
itself asks judges to determine whether a defendant's likelihood of endangering the
community (especially prospective witnesses and jurors) reaches a threshold of "serious
risk." 18 USC § 3142(f) (1982 & 1985 Supp II). For a criticism of the interest-balancing
approach generally and the Bail Reform Act in particular, see Alschuler, 85 Mich L Rev
at 512-20 (cited in note 90).
130. In his dissent in Santosky, Justice Rehnquist makes a similar point:
New York's adoption of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard reflects its
conclusion that the undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of parental
unfitness ... is roughly equal to the undesirable consequence of an erroneous




Psychiatric predictions of violence are enshrined in public policies that reflect
our collective reluctance to incarcerate seriously disordered persons when they
need medical care13' and our belief that psychological factors ought to play a
role in determining culpability.'32 This Article argues that clinical decisions
about dangerousness are fraught with ambiguity that can be given a mathemati-
cal characterization. This characterization strongly suggests clinicians should not
be held accountable for the consequences of most incorrect violence predictions.
Given the nature of current commitment laws and clinicians' reasonable
expectations about civil liability,133 clinicians will continue to make prediction-
based decisions. This Article does not imply that they can or should cease doing
so. Clinicians should bear in mind that whether they utilize their customary
"intuition" or formalized prediction instruments, predictions about future
violence currently have only modest intrinsic accuracy,'3 ' and decisions based
on those predictions are subject to a host of moral ambiguities that are not easily
reducible. Extremely accurate prediction tools would mitigate the impact of these
ambiguities, M  but the inherent nature of violent behavior, with its complex
interplay of individual and environmental variables, makes it unlikely that very
accurate predictions will soon be possible. Research and commentary on violence
prediction should bear in mind that prediction accuracy and the blameworthiness
of decisions are separate issues. Even if significant improvements in prediction
accuracy are achieved, such improvements should not, by themselves, provide
reasons to hold clinicians responsible for dangerousness decisions that go wrong.
state legislatures. It cannot be said that the New York procedures are unconstitu-
tional simply because a majority of the Members of this Court disagree with the
New York Legislature's weighing of the interests of the parents and the child in an
error-free factfinding hearing.
Santosky, 455 US at 788 n 13 (Rehnquist dissenting).
131. Otto, 5 Forensic Rptr at 106 (cited in note 6); Arthur R. Matthews, Observations
on Police Policy and Procedures for Emergency Detention of the Mentally Ill, 61 J Crim
L Criminol & Police Sci 283, 288-90 (1970).
132. Twentieth Century Fund, Fair and Certain Punisbment (Priority, 1976).
133. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
134. See Mossman, 62 J Consulting & Clin Psych 783, 787-89 tbls 3-4 (cited in note
3).
135. One commercially available version of the enzyme-linked immuno-assay for
detecting HIV, the "AIDS virus," has an AUC > 0.999, see Somoza, et al, 24 Intl J
Biomed Computing at 164-66 (cited in note 36), and Mossman and Somoza, 3 J Neuro-
psychiatry & Clin Neurosci at 332 (cited in note 64), which is equivalent to a diagnostic
test in which A - 5, see note 76. The use of such a prediction tool would greatly reduce
var(ZFPR) calculated in Equation 10, and would change the 95% confidence interval in
Equation 11a to ZFPR = -2.682 ± 0.510. Clinicians could then be expected to correctly
identify 96.5% to 99.8% of all violent patients and 98.5% to 99.9% of all non-violent
patients, even with no change in the errors in U. and Pr. There is no reason, however,
to believe that clinicians will ever be able to predict future violence with this kind of
accuracy. FVTs where A = 2 seem to be the upper limit of what we can soon hope for.
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V. Appendix-Derivation of Equation 4
We rewrite Equation 1':
[Al] EU = (Pr)(TPR)(Up) + (Pr)(1-TPR)(UN) + (1-Pr)(FPR)(UFl)
+ (1-Pr)(1-FPR)(UTN)
from Equation 67-1, with B = 1,
[A21 ZTpR = ZpR + A
because ZOR and Zp, are the normal deviates of TPR and FPR,
[A3] TPR = D(ZR) = D(ZpRp + A) and FPR = D(ZFR),
where D(.) is the unit normal cumulative distribution function:
[A4] (D(y) fe J dt.
Setting Up = UT = 1 and UFN 0, Equation Al becomes
[AS] EU = (Pr)(TPR) + (1-Pr)FPR)(U p) + (1-Pr)(1-FPR).
We now differentiate Equation A5 with respect to ZFPR:
[A6] e r --P - + -e T -r e -
azFPR +2i (UF)(_n V 1-r)
Setting this derivative equal to 0 and rearranging terms:
-(Z,,,+ A ) Z2
[A7] (Pr)e - = (1-Pr)(1-UFP)e




[A81 e -- I_-= -- Pr U
e
We expand the left side of Equation A7 and take the natural logarithm of both
sides:
[A9] - AZFPR - A - In Pr
When Equation A9 is solved for ZR, we obtain Equation 4 in the text.
